Covid-19 e Ciber-Ameaças... Um Vírus Pode Ocultar Outro!

‘LES ASSISES DE LA RECHERCHE STRATEGIQUE’ | 17.09.2020 | CNAM

via o nosso amigo Alain Bauer

Le CNAM, son pôle Sécurité Défense Renseignement, l’Équipe Sécurité Défense, Renseignement, Criminologie, Crises, Cybermenaces (ESD R3C) organisent cette année, en partenariat avec Géostratégia, les Xème Assises de la recherche stratégique le 17 septembre 2020 de 8h30 à 18h.



Les échanges seront diffusés en direct sur les réseaux du Cnam.

Moment essentiel, les Assises de la Recherche Stratégique prendront cette année plus que jamais à bras-le-corps les enjeux sécuritaires contemporains, et proposeront un état des lieux complet et éclairant des bouleversements sans précédent à l’aune des crises liées à la pandémie de Covid-19.

Cette journée de réflexion verra se succéder différents panels impliquant des invités exceptionnels autour du thème suivant : "Un virus peut en cacher un autre", Covid-19 et Cybermenaces.

Vous pourrez retrouver le programme détaillé de la journée directement sur le site internet de l’ESD-R3C.

http://recherche.cnam.fr/agenda-actus/assises-de-la-recherche-strategique-2020-1187618.kjsp

“Il Turco alla Porta”, a nova edição da Limes

Di cosa tratta:  Il numero è incentrato sulla strategia imperiale della Turchia e sul suo impatto sugli interessi nazionali dell’Italia. La Turchia sta infatti provando oggi a recuperare una dimensione persa con la fine dell’impero ottomano a seguito della prima guerra mondiale.

https://www.limesonline.com/il-turco-alla-porta-il-numero-720-di-limes/119442

Perché dobbiamo occuparci della Turchia

Ankara si è immersa nel Mediterraneo per recuperare il relitto della potenza perduta, innescando un maremoto geopolitico .....

https://www.limesonline.com/geopolitica-turchia/119452

 

La guerra Emirati-Turchia rimpicciolisce l’Italia

Il conflitto tra Turchia ed Emirati Arabi Uniti (Eau) riveste un ruolo fondamentale e crescente tra Mediterraneo orientale e Africa, tra Levante e Asia occidentale. Abu Dhabi vede il governo di Recep Tayyip Erdoğan come la più pericolosa minaccia strategica per i propri interessi e per la propria visione del futuro geopolitico di un quadrante in fermento. Una minaccia che è sempre più determinata a .....

https://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/la-guerra-emirati-turchia-rimpicciolisce-litalia

 

Altro che Islam. Guardate la Mappa per Capire la Turchia

L’Occidente trascura l’urgenza turca di proiettarsi nel Caucaso e nel Mediterraneo orientale per proteggere il ventre anatolico .....

https://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/altro-che-islam-guardate-la-mappa-per-capire-la-turchia

Entretanto, no Le Monde:

Tensions en Méditerranée: Ankara ne reculera devant aucune «sanction»

https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/tensions-en-mediterranee-ankara-ne-reculera-devant-aucune-sanction-15-08-2020-2387845_24.php

O Novo “Grande Jogo” Global e o Regresso do Risco Geopolítico

Thomas Gomart põe os pontos nos ii do grande jogo geopolítico actual e seus riscos. O director do IFRI sublinha o regresso do risco geopolítico, lamenta que face às potências emergentes, os “meios de negócios” apenas tenham visto mercados emergentes (com o inelutável resultado da globalização das trocas chocar com o regresso da geopolítica...) e analisa o “triângulo” Rússia-China-Estados Unidos. Uma entrevista que diz tudo sobre como é o mundo visto de Paris, capital política da Europa. Sobre esta “Europa”, Gomart é taxativo: “Temos uma Europa compósita: cada um utiliza a União Europeia para fazer avançar os seus interesses”...

Entretien avec Thomas Gomart – Russie, Chine, Etats-Unis: qui est de trop?

 

Hadrien Desuin De Hadrien Desuin| Conflits | 14 août 2020 | Dans Asie de l'Est, BAC, Europe de l'est

 

Directeur de l’IFRI, le principal think tank français de relations internationales fondé par Thierry de Montbrial, Thomas Gomart reçoit Hadrien Desuin de Conflits dans son bureau pour échanger sur la Russie et ses rapports aux États-Unis et à la Chine. Thomas Gomart vient de publier “Le Retour du risque géopolitique, Le triangle stratégique Russie, Chine, États-Unis”, Paris, Institut de l’Entreprise, 2016, 56 p., préface de Patrick Pouyanné.

De gauche à droite: le président russe Vladimir Poutine, le président des Etats-Unis Donald Trump, son homologue vietnamien Tran Dai Quang et le président chinois Xi Jinping le 11 novembre 2017 (c) Sipa

 

Conflits: Vous constatez que la mondialisation des échanges se heurte au retour de la géopolitique.

 

Thomas Gomart: Le «doux commerce» de Montesquieu a vécu.

 

Les échanges commerciaux ont commencé à stagner en 2009-2010 tandis que les échanges d’informations continuent à croître de façon exponentielle.

 

La mondialisation s’accélère en termes technologiques mais rétrécit en termes politique et institutionnel. C’est un retour aux logiques de puissance.

 

Les milieux d’affaires ont vu des marchés émergents, pas des puissances émergentes, une absence regrettable.

 

Conflits: Le triangle Russie, Chine, États-Unis continue de structurer le monde depuis 1971, mais la Russie n’est-elle pas de trop dans ce trio aujourd’hui? 

1971 voit le voyage de Nixon en Chine. Le segment faible du triangle est alors la Chine. Et Nixon y va justement pour affaiblir l’URSS.

 

45 ans après, le segment faible est la Russie qui se débat pour se maintenir dans le trio. Or, la Chine va continuer à croître, les États-Unis sont dans un déclin très relatif et la Russie continue à se rétracter.

 

Chine et États-Unis: 35% de la richesse mondiale, la Russie moins de 3%. En 1991, les économies chinoise et soviétique étaient comparables. Aujourd’hui l’économie russe représente 20% de l’économie chinoise.

 

La Russie cherche à se maintenir au niveau de Washington et Pékin avec des moyens comparables à ceux de la France et du Royaume-Uni. «Puissance pauvre», elle est en distorsion très forte entre ses ambitions et ses moyens.

 

A lire aussi: Chine, Etats-Unis, UE: qui gagnera la guerre?

 

Conflits: La Russie avait annoncé un pivot vers l’Asie que les sanctions européennes pourraient accélérer.

 

Les Occidentaux ont raté l’ancrage de la Russie dans leur structure euro-atlantique à la sortie de la guerre froide.

 

Grâce à des liens historiques, culturels, humains de toute nature, l’Union européenne est le premier partenaire commercial de la Russie avec 50% de son commerce extérieur. Fondamentalement elle constitue la porte d’entrée de la Russie vers la mondialisation.

 

Les sanctions ferment cette porte mais les élites russes raisonnent bien plus que les nôtres en termes géopolitiques. Pour elles, la Russie est aussi une puissance du Pacifique qui doit participer au pivot mondial vers l’Asie.

 

Après l’annexion de la Crimée, la Russie veut montrer qu’elle reste une grande nation qui construit un partenariat avec la Chine en particulier dans le domaine énergétique. Mais l’asymétrie entre les deux pays est énorme!

 

Par ailleurs, le dernier conflit militaire russo-chinois date de 1969, il est encore dans les mémoires. Le pivot de la Russie vers le Pacifique doit donc être nuancé et compris aussi comme un récit ou un «discours» géopolitique.

 

Conflits: Il y a tout de même une complémentarité énergétique russo-asiatique qui pèse lourd…

 

Bien sûr avec la Chine mais aussi le Japon et la Corée.

 

Poutine estime que le principal succès de sa politique étrangère, c’est le traité frontalier sino-russe de 2005.

 

À l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai, Russes et Chinois coopèrent pour la stabilisation de l’Asie centrale, jusqu’à l’Iran. Mais 80% de la population russe vit sur le territoire européen et continue à regarder vers l’ouest même si elle cherche des alternatives. Y parviendra-t-elle? Je n’en suis pas sûr.

 

A lire aussi: Rien que la terre: La géopolitique gaullienne avant de Gaulle

 

Conflits: «J’ai pris la Russie comme le général de Gaulle a pris la France» a déclaré un jour Vladimir Poutine. Dans quelle mesure le souverainisme poutinien est-il une déclinaison russe du gaullisme? 

 

Nous n’avons pas réussi à dépasser la vision d’un Poutine soit gaulliste soit tchékiste.

 

Pour les milieux diplomatiques et intellectuels, Poutine est un tchékiste qui ne parviendra pas à sortir de sa matrice. Pour les milieux d’affaires et militaires, c’est un gaulliste qui a restauré la grandeur de son pays. On ne peut pas comparer. Fondamentalement, la Russie n’a pas d’alliances, ce qui n’était pas le cas de la France gaulliste.

 

En fait, nous avons un problème géopolitique avec la Russie et la Russie a un problème géoéconomique avec nous.

 

La gestion de la crise ukrainienne a été déléguée à la Commission européenne, alors que l’Union européenne n’est pas un acteur géopolitique. De plus, Bruxelles a encouragé l’intégration régionale partout dans le monde, à l’exception de l’espace post-soviétique.

 

Ce sont deux très fortes contradictions qui ont rendu un partenariat avec la Russie improbable. À cela s’ajoute que l’Europe est très mal à l’aise avec des puissances comme la Russie et la Turquie.

 

Quant à Poutine, il éprouve une grande condescendance vis-à-vis du projet européen auquel il ne croit pas. Le Brexit ne peut que l’ancrer dans cette conviction.

 

Conflits: Les pays d’Europe centrale ont aussi poussé à l’affrontement…

 

On a une Europe composite, chacun utilise l’Union européenne pour pousser ses intérêts.

 

Ces petits pays ont un poids qu’ils n’auraient jamais pu avoir en dehors de l’Union. Le partenariat oriental subit une influence polono-suédoise, par exemple. Cette question du voisinage européen a des résonances historiques fortes avec deux non-dits: la Turquie et la Russie.

 

Conflits: Énergie, militaire et numérique sont trois grands pouvoirs qui structurent le monde selon vous, pourquoi avoir choisi le numérique? On parle de «bombe numérique», n’est-on pas en train de fantasmer la guerre numérique ?

 

Sur le numérique, les États-Unis disposent des principaux acteurs.

 

Pour paraphraser John Connally et sa formule sur le dollar, on pourrait dire «Internet est notre système mais c’est votre problème».

 

Internet est le centre nerveux du système monde. Qui domine lnternet domine le centre nerveux et donc domine le monde. Internet est aussi le principal moyen de garder le contrôle sur ses principaux alliés japonais et européens.

 

A lire aussi:

 

Livre – Alexandre Douguine, l’appel de l’Eurasie

De Thomas Stemler | 11 août 2020

 

Russie-Europe, aux racines d’un malentendu

De Pascal Gauchon | 12 août 2020

Israel-Emirados: O Médio Oriente Desperta para a Realidade

Trump conseguiu remeter os Estados Unidos no centro do xadrez do Médio Oriente, com a vitória “inesperada” (na verdade, esperada por todos os analistas sérios dos processos em curso na zona) do estabelecimento de relações entre Israel e os Emirados (ou seja, o início formal da normalização com os Estados do “Conselho do Golfo” e o mundo sunita). Este importante facto geopolítico é aqui contextualizado e analisado por Peter Zeihan, com a sua habitual frieza clínica. Pena que esta análise de Zeihan tenha deixado de lado a Turquia e o seu imperial sonho otomano. 

Waking Up to Reality in the Middle East

by Peter Zeihan

Thursday, August 13 the Trump administration released a series of breathless communiques proclaiming the onset of formal peace and diplomatic recognition between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Shortly thereafter the Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed the American releases in both substance and theme. The Emirati leader, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, was far less…gushy in his own announcement, but critically contradicted nothing stated by Trump or Netanyahu.

Waitaminute! Don't the Arabs hate Israel? Why in the world would a rich Arab statelet on the far side of the Arabian Peninsula want to exchange ambassadors with the Zionists??

It isn't so much that the Emiratis don’t care about the Palestinians any longer (although they really, really don’t), and instead it is bound up with the rapidly simplifying American position in the Middle East. The Americans have nearly completed their pullout from the overall region, and the Emiratis are hoping to get ahead of their rapidly disintegrating geopolitical environment.

In the aftermath of World War II, the Americans crafted the global Order to bribe up an alliance to fight the Soviets. Part of that was funding rebuilding, financing the construction of industrial plant, and enabling the Europeans and East Asians to access the American consumer market. All that required oil, and that oil for the most part came from the Middle East. And so, the Americans went to the Middle East.

We are now thirty years after the Soviet collapse. Americans are done managing the world, and the Americans are especially done managing the Middle East. They're going home. Troop rotations have outnumbered permanent deployments in-region for years. The Iraqi deployment is quickly approaching zero. The Syrian deployment is no longer more than a rounding error. Only Afghanistan remains as a meaningful deployment, and it is a deployment few Americans want to continue. The naval base in Bahrain and CENTCOM's operations center in Qatar only continue existing to service the Afghan deployment. And that’s…all of it.

From the United Arab Emirates' point of view this is an unmitigated disaster. The UAE (and their fellow Gulf states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar) don't care what US troops do in the Middle East or how many locals they kill or how many US troops die at the locals' hands. They simply want the Americans present – both regionally and around the world. So long as the global superpower is active, the Gulfies don't have to worry about guarding the production, processing, and exporting infrastructure for their oil and natural gas. So long as the Americans are globally engaged and guaranteeing freedom of the seas for all, the Gulfies know their hydrocarbon exports will safely arrive at their customers' ports. National safety and national bank. For them, it's that simple.

Those heady days are over. America's withdrawal from the wider world has been a longer running development than its Middle Eastern wrap-ups. It, too, is now multiple presidential administrations underway. Total US force deployments globally are at the lowest level since before the Great Depression, and still trending down.

For the Emiratis in specific and the Gulfies in general, the Americans' past-the-point-of-no-return departure conjures up multiple, reinforcing disasters.

1: Iran

Unlike many who have a finger in the world of national security, I've never found Iran to be strategically threatening.

Iran's army is designed to oppress its own population, not march on its neighbors. Its air force hasn't been updated since the fall of the shah in 1979, and the Iranians are running out of jets to fall out of the sky. It's navy…well, it doesn't have a navy. It has a bunch of speedboats. Should Iran march on the Gulf states, it would face four challenges:

First, its army would have to march. It isn't motorized. Second, it would have to first march through its own region of Khuzestan – a region populated by restive minorities. Third, it would have to cross a pontoon bridge into Basra, Iraq's second-largest city. A high-school science experiment could take out the bridge, while needing to pacify Basra's two-million-strong population at the beginning of an invasion's supply line would about as much fun for the Iranians as it was for the Americans when they conquered/liberated Iraq in 2003. Finally, there's a blistering six hundred miles of completely empty desert between the Kuwaiti border and any meaningful infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. That's a loooooong walk.

Yet as unimpressed as I am by the Iranian military, it is the freakin' Roman Legion compared to the militaries of the Gulf states. The Gulfies are beyond military incompetent because they've never had to be competent. Sure, the Emiratis and Saudis are getting some good target practice for their air forces in Yemen, but their armies are largely paperweights and none of them have a navy that's more than a coast guard. Not only have all depended upon the Americans to do their fighting for them, most consider a functional domestic military a potential threat to the ruling dynasties.

2: Their own populations

All the Gulfies ship in vast swathes of workers, to the point that over 70% of the "populations" of Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are imported labor. This isn't like Western Europe or the United States where the migrants do jobs the locals don't want. In the Gulf states, the migrants do everything. The migrants are not allowed to bring their families or own property, and as soon as the migrant men lose the ability to carry their own weight or the women lose their looks, they are rooted out and sent packing. They are regularly the target of every assault imaginable, including sexual assault.

In the United states, we have a word for that: slavery.

Treat this many people this badly, and only the existence of a wildly intrusive and brutal and unfettered internal security service can maintain domestic control for the ruling dynasties. As much of a threat as Iran is, the day-to-day internal pressures of the Gulf states are far more likely to end them.

Many make light of the fact that the actual citizens of the Gulf states could be a risk as well. After all, they are used to cradle-to-grave support for everything from food to rent to hookah bars. The idea being, that should social spending falter, the locals might rise up against their rulers.

While I don't quite dismiss this concern out of hand, I'm not all that worried. The Gulf states in general – and the UAE in particular – have addressed this problem by helping their peoples consume as many saturated fats as possible to make them as unhealthy as possible. The idea being that overweight people laden with heart disease who can only get around on scooters aren't the type to leave their air-conditioned compounds to riot in the desert sun. Pampered corpulence as a national security strategy might sound odd, but it works for the most part. Therefore, I am – and the local governments are – more watchful of the larger, younger, healthier, angrier and institutionally abused slave class.

The only way this system is sustainable is if the money from hydrocarbon sales keeps flowing in and whoever guarantees Gulf state security turns a blind eye. The Americans are leaving, endangering both the income flows and the political cover.

3: Outside expeditionary powers

Key thing to keep in mind when considering the United States in the Middle East: the US was primarily interested in Middle East oil for its alliance network, not for itself. Historically, the United States has gotten nearly all its crude from its own territories or its North American neighbors, plus Venezuela. With America's shale revolution now mid-way through its second decade, technically, it is already independent. Its need for Middle Eastern oil has gone from minor to nearly nonexistent.

Not so for…pretty much anyone else. Despite all the Green rhetoric on wind, solar and the like, combined they still generate only about 2% of the world's total energy needs. Oil and natural gas clock in at more than half. And for most of the world, it must be imported. From the Persian Gulf.

Outside powers who have been dependent upon the Americans to maintain energy flows can do the math. Outside powers who have navies can do it faster. The first time there's a real energy crisis anywhere in the world after the Americans have left the Middle East, we're going to see some records broken for sailing times from the United Kingdom, France, India and Japan to the Persian Gulf.

Note: China can only play in the Persian Gulf if the United States makes the Pacific and Indian Oceans safe operating zones for the Chinese navy. The Chinese navy only has a handful of ships that can sail beyond the First Island Chain. The operative word is "sail". It is almost certain they cannot fight their way much past the Chain, much less operate five thousand miles beyond it in the Middle East. China simply is not an expeditionary power, and is a non-power in the Persian Gulf.

The Gulfies might not like the Americans very much, but the Americans have had a vested interest in the Gulf states remaining independent and making boatloads of money by selling their hydrocarbons. For the locals it was a sweet deal. Any post-American power that comes to the Gulf is unlikely to be nearly as…understanding.

So, what does this all have to do with a normalization of relations deal between the UAE and Israel. Simply put, the Emiratis (really, all the Gulfies) know the Americans are leaving and they are massively – hysterically – unable to look out for their own interests in the world that's coming. Between the threats of Iran, their own populations and extra-regional powers, none of them are long for this world.

Unless they can get some help. They need someone who can help them resist Iran. They need someone who can help them infiltrate and purge undesirable elements from their own populations. They need someone who can help them stand up to far outsiders.

Banding together is off the table. As much as the Gulf states dislike Iran, they like one another even less. These are not countries. They are dynasties. It is as if each of the Kardashian sisters ran her own kingdom. (The GCC – for those of you who follow the region enough to know what that is – is nothing more than the Saudi attempt to force everyone to do things their way.). The Gulfies trust – they all trust – Israel more than one another.

To call Thursday's agreement a peace deal is a rhetorical flourish. A bit of PR flim-flamery. The UAE and Israel were not at war. Israeli military planners didn’t lose much sleep thinking about Emirati-backed militant cells in Palestine or Syria or Lebanon targeting their populations, much less a conventional Emirati military attack. Thursday’s announcement was more about a public acknowledgement of cold, hard, geopolitical reality: the issue isn’t an Israel-Arab divide being healed, much less one of Jewish-Islamic ecumenical healing. The difference hasn’t been that broad is decades.

Rather, it is about an American security dependent heeding the writing on the wall. Of wanting to (of having to) protect their interests (their existence) without the promise (or hope) of American intervention. The Emiratis are worried about Tehran. About Tokyo. About Paris. About New Delhi. About London. (About Riyadh.)

They should be.

The real kicker? This diplomatic normalization is only the first step. In time the UAE – indeed, each of the Gulf states – will need to partner with an outside power if they are to survive the predations of the others. Kudos to the Emiratis for the first-mover advantage. They've not only gained themselves a diplomatic, political, intelligence and military partner, they've broken the ice and made it a bit easier to stomach partnering with a true infidel.

Time will tell if it is enough.

Nova Cartografia das profissões de Inteligência Económica, pela École de Guerre Économique de Paris

10 ans après la publication de la première cartographie des métiers de l’intelligence économique en 2009, l’AEGE/EGE publie une nouvelle mise à jour de la cartographie tenant compte de l’évolution des métiers et de l’apparition de nouvelles fonctions au sein des organisations.

L’édition 2019 s’appuie sur l’expertise des Clubs Métiers de l’AEGE et des 1800 anciens étudiants de l’Ecole de Guerre Economique. 

Forte de 22 ans d’existence, l’Ecole de Guerre Economique est la référence des formations en Intelligence Economique en France et délivre le titre d’ "Expert(e) en Intelligence Economique" Niveau I, RNCP. 

https://www.ege.fr/index.php/actualites/evenements/item/nouvelle-cartographie-des-metiers-de-l-intelligence-economique-2019.html

Cartografia das profissões de Cibersegurança 2020, pela École de Guerre Économique de Paris

L’Ecole de Guerre Economique et le Club Cyber de l’AEGE publient la "Cartographie des métiers de la Cybersécurité" dans le cadre des formations dispensées à l’Ecole depuis 2016.

Les zones bleues se rapportent à des familles de métiers Cyber typés management, alors que celles en jaune sont plus orientés ingénierie et technique. 

La cartographie prend en compte les évolutions de la Cybersécurité et le retour "terrain" des diplômés de l'Ecole de Guerre Economique. Elle a pour base les études suivantes: 

- la liste des métiers élaborée par l’OPIIEC en 2017 suite à une étude sur «les formations et les compétences en France sur la cybersécurité»; 

- liste de "profils métiers" dans le domaine de la sécurité du numérique élaborée par l'ANSSI en 2015 intitulée "Les métiers de la SSI"; 

- le document du NIST SP800-181 de novembre 2016. 

https://www.ege.fr/index.php/actualites/evenements/item/ecole-de-guerre-economique-publie-la-cartographie-des-metiers-de-la-cybersecurite-2020.html