Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta George Friedman. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta George Friedman. Mostrar todas as mensagens

segunda-feira, 3 de outubro de 2022

Mudanças Radicais na Concepção e na Estrutura do Poder Militar

São perspectivas novas e inéditas que George Friedman vê abrirem-se nas concepções e estruturas da potência militar. Uma análise que é indispensável conhecer e uma evolução que é imprescindível seguir. Uma "leitura" que vem ao encontro dos interesses nacionais portugueses e lhe abre novos horizontes, numa perspectiva há muito defendida pela equipa "intelNomics", a do "dual use".


The Military Power in the 21st Century


"The evolution of military power is one of the most important if underrated geopolitical changes happening in the world today.  


Throughout the 20th century, military power was the province of large nations. With advances in martial technology, war no longer requires a massive population, nor does it require massive consumption of raw material.

 

This has significant geopolitical consequences. We can see this evolution most clearly in Israel.  


Founded first on French and then American weapons, the Israeli military now has homegrown capabilities that it (ironically) can sell to others.  


They are designed around the principle that putting troops at risk is a possible but rare event, while using unmanned force as the dominant element of strategy.  


Israel has come the furthest with this strategy, but it can be seen also in places such as the United Arab Emirates and Singapore.  


As a result, each wields international political power far beyond what might have been expected from it during the prior era.  


New technologies enable small powers to engage much larger powers.  


The core of the force is the technologists who maintain and upgrade systems – a fraction of the manpower needed by the old definition of great powers." 


terça-feira, 22 de fevereiro de 2022

“A Europa é um local estranho”, diz George Friedman a propósito da crise na Ucrânia


Europe is a strange place. Afirma o nosso velho amigo Friedman que passa a explicar: On one hand, senior European leaders in Germany and France have sided with the United States in the crisis. Both countries are aware of the fragility of Europe’s eastern front and the need to stiffen it. Poland and Hungary are members of NATO, and as such, Poland should be supported on all levels, while Hungary should be reminded of the benefits of membership as well as its obligations. On the other hand, in spite of declarations by major European leaders, and NATO’s policy and mobilization, the EU seems oblivious to the dangers and allowed serious actions to be imposed at this moment against two significant members of NATO, one committed to defending Europe and the other in need of persuasion. (...) The fact is that there is an insularity that has emerged in Europe since 1991 that holds that the only thing threatening Europe is the exaggerated fears of the Americans, and that the rule of law transcends the reality of tanks. This is a nuisance to the United States but a deep danger for Europe. There are real dangers out there (whether Russia’s military buildup is one or not is irrelevant), and Europe can be blind to them but cannot avoid them. The rule of law does not trump military force. The last is well known to Europe. (...) But it derives from a system of law and governance that is willfully and pleasantly blind to what is out there.

Europe and the Ukraine Crisis

George Friedman | GPF | February 22, 2022

Last week, the European Union’s highest court ruled that Brussels can withhold funding from member states that violate the rule of law, slapping down a legal challenge from Hungary and Poland. The ruling clears the way for the European Commission to levy certain penalties against Budapest and Warsaw, including suspending payments to both countries from the EU’s budget. These payments are in the billions of euros and are important to these countries for sustaining their economies. What is important is that this decision, pending for more than a year, was published in the midst of the face-off with Russia over Ukraine, at a time when Europe needs to present a united front.

Now, courts are known at times to be oblivious to realities outside the courtroom, but not to overwhelming realities. I doubt that two days after Pearl Harbor, an American judge would have sentenced a group of American sailors for drunken brawling; stern warnings would be given and the sailors returned to their ship. There was a war on, and sailors would be fighting it.

Poland and Hungary are part of the line running from the Baltic to the Black Sea that would absorb any Russian attack on Europe. There will likely not be such an attack, but “likely” is not a term much honored in the history of geopolitics. Poland guards the North European Plain, the main path of invasion – in both directions. Poland’s fear of and opposition to Russia is built into its DNA. It recently bought about $6 billion worth of tanks from the United States. Those tanks will stand between Belarus and Germany. The European Court of Justice’s ruling not only grants Brussels the legal authority to divert critical money from Poland, but also signals to Poland that for the EU it is business as usual. Poland may be facing its ancient enemy, but the EU lacks the wit to postpone the ruling.

The Hungarian situation is the opposite of Poland. Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, visited Russian President Vladimir Putin shortly after the Ukraine crisis broke. He said he agreed with Putin’s demands for security guarantees and was allowed to purchase a great deal of Russian natural gas at a discount. Hungary is not as strategically significant as Poland, but shifting toward alignment with Russia at this time is not in the interest of those resisting a potential attack. The EU should be doing what it can to draw Hungary out of the Russian relationship and into the European system, but instead it chose this moment to chastise Budapest and threaten to cut funding. Orban is not in the minority in Hungary with his distrust of the EU, and the bloc’s action at this moment reduces the chances of drawing Hungary back into the fold.

Europe is a strange place. On one hand, senior European leaders in Germany and France have sided with the United States in the crisis. Both countries are aware of the fragility of Europe’s eastern front and the need to stiffen it. Poland and Hungary are members of NATO, and as such, Poland should be supported on all levels, while Hungary should be reminded of the benefits of membership as well as its obligations. On the other hand, in spite of declarations by major European leaders, and NATO’s policy and mobilization, the EU seems oblivious to the dangers and allowed serious actions to be imposed at this moment against two significant members of NATO, one committed to defending Europe and the other in need of persuasion.

As I said at the beginning, courts must frequently be oblivious to what is happening around them – or at least pretend to be. But there are also times when it is impossible to ignore what is happening. At that point, prudence and a sense of proportion would dictate a postponement of a verdict that runs counter to overriding needs. And when the judges are unable to grasp reality, a retired judge invites someone for lunch. I know that the EU legal system is so pure that the needs of Europe never enter their minds. But the fact is that they are neither so pure nor blind. There was something malicious in acting as they did when they did.

Whether Russia’s actions are real or feigned is not the point. The fact is that there is an insularity that has emerged in Europe since 1991 that holds that the only thing threatening Europe is the exaggerated fears of the Americans, and that the rule of law transcends the reality of tanks. This is a nuisance to the United States but a deep danger for Europe. There are real dangers out there (whether Russia’s military buildup is one or not is irrelevant), and Europe can be blind to them but cannot avoid them. The rule of law does not trump military force. The last is well known to Europe.

The decision to rule against Poland and Hungary is not the pivot of history. But it derives from a system of law and governance that is willfully and pleasantly blind to what is out there.

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/europe-and-the-ukraine-crisis/


terça-feira, 18 de janeiro de 2022

Crescimento da China cai para uns "míseros" 4%

Atenção, este é o número oficialmente reconhecido pelo PC chinês, para o último trimestre de 2021. Recorde-se que qualquer taxa de crescimento do PIB chinês abaixo dos 7% é "negativa", ou seja, a China não consegue, com crescimentos abaixo dos 7%, satisfazer as exigências da estratégia de expansão económica e de "harmonia" social interna. Sendo conhecida a forma como o PC chinês lida com as estatísticas, estes oficiais "4%" revelam a existência de graves problemas estruturais na economia chinesa, confirmando a tese do nosso amigo George Friedman sobre a enorme fragilidade da economia chinesa. E assinalam também o fim da era dourada do crescimento acima dos 7% que o boom das importações euro-americanas (UE+USA) havia potenciado...


segunda-feira, 10 de janeiro de 2022

George Friedman: The Continuing Storm

By George Friedman January 10, 2022


This article was first published by Geopolitical Futures and is reprinted here with permission. 

It has been about two years since “The Storm Before the Calm: America’s Discord, the Crisis of the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond” was published, and about three years since I submitted it to my editor at Penguin Random House. As 2022 begins, I’d like to summarize where I think we are. Let’s begin with the American institutional crisis, which is intensifying.

Historically, institutional crises in the U.S. are generated by wars – the American Revolution, the Civil War, World War II – in 80-year intervals, each creating different structures for managing the federal government. This time is different. 2025 will be 80 years since the end of World War II. But our institutions are already shifting, driven not by war but by COVID-19.

World War II was won by experts, and in its aftermath, experts were placed at the center of governance. The weakness of expertise is that experts are structurally narrow. They know their fields brilliantly but can’t know the whole. COVID-19 places medical experts at the center of things. But as I have argued, their expertise could address the medical problem (and I think they have done fairly well), but they are institutionally indifferent to the consequences of their solutions outside their field. Their institutional solutions created massive disruption, from developmental problems in children due to distance learning and no social interaction with each other to enormous economic and social problems. The supply chain crisis continues to threaten huge economic dislocation. The social tensions that have arisen have intensified political divisions in the United States and elsewhere, as well as individual frictions that can be seen clearly in air travel. The pandemic generated a range of problems beyond the medical sphere, and some of them had deep ramifications for the future.

I argued in my book that expertise is necessary, but that there was no systematic method of bringing other areas of expertise to bear, and in particular no institution that could oversee the multiple and sometimes contradictory areas of expertise. The office of the president is incapable of carrying out this function. George Washington created the Cabinet to support the president, but the Cabinet is almost moribund while any president is limited. What is needed is institutionalized common sense. Common sense can see beyond any single solution and measure the net result with a sense of the future of the commonwealth. An institutional shift will take place that controls expertise without dispensing with it.

We are seeing the institutional problem all around us, with the economy, society and polity. I think we can see a solution, but as with war, the fog of an institutional shift remains, and the crisis will deepen in multiple areas before a solution is forced on the system. We are getting there but are not there yet.

The social and political crisis is obvious. The country has split into two political camps that hold each other in utter contempt. Congress is almost evenly divided, and there is no clarity emerging politically, nor any common understanding on any issues, which means that the pressure on the decaying institutional system will intensify. Looking back at the late 1960s and 1970s, the last socio-economic shift, we see violent riots, frequently pivoting on race, and an economic system of intensifying inflation, presidents forced from office or impeached and so on. I would benchmark us at about 1975, with the violence declining a bit, the economy seeming to be out of control, and the political system incapable of functioning and trying to absorb defeat in Vietnam while coping with the Soviet Union and China. 

The major difference this time is the labor shortage, whereas in 1975 the problem was unemployment.

President Gerald Ford could not get control of the government or deal with the problems. It was not his fault, but the time was not right – the social and political system was not yet unsustainable. The idea was taking hold that the nation ought to reach back into the Roosevelt era and solve the problem that way. Thus, Jimmy Carter was elected, and he decided to cut taxes on the lower- and middle-income classes, at a time of inflation. It had an inevitable effect and delegitimized the Roosevelt era. Ronald Reagan was elected next, and without fully understanding what was happening, he presided over the opening of the new era.

The institutional, social, economic and political crises are in full view now and resemble much of the prior cycle. Presidents do not make history, but they do preside over it, the best managing the system to go where it must. If history follows the past, which it does not do in detail, the 2022 elections will further make the system unworkable while the crisis intensifies. As the last cycle reached back to Roosevelt, the 2024 election will likely reach back to Reagan, at least in spirit. The spirit won’t work, and I would guess that 2028 will bring to power the heir to Jackson, Hayes, Roosevelt and Reagan, none of whom knew how to solve the problem, but will preside over the problem resolving itself, both institutionally and socio-economically.

The hard times aren’t over yet. Isolated expertise continues to rule, and our animosity for those different from us politically, socially and racially will not give up.

So far my forecast for this decade has worked out, but there is ample opportunity for me to be proved wrong. I rather hope I am wrong, but I can’t deny a counter wish for being right.

In The Storm Before the Calm, George Friedman, master geopolitical forecaster and New York Times bestselling author of The Next 100 Years focuses on the United States, predicting how the 2020s will bring dramatic upheaval and reshaping of American government, foreign policy, economics, and culture.  A Bloomberg Best Books of 2020. For more by George Friedman go to https://geopoliticalfutures.com/

domingo, 18 de julho de 2021

Alain Juillet, Christian Harbulot, George Friedman, John Robb e Alain Bauer na lista dos trabalhos de Verão do intelNomics

A evolução nestes últimos dez ou doze meses ("guerra" do covid, Presidente Biden, Xinjiang, Hong-Kong, Taiwan e os 100 anos do PCCh, nova "guerra fria", alastrar do islamismo em África, 'notícias' da Alemanha e da energia, falhas clamorosas na cibersegurança e sequentes disrupções e ransonwares, etc.), tudo isto (e mais algumas coisas) faz com que esteja a ficar na hora de termos aqui uma nova conversa com Alain Juillet... E também novas intervenções de Christian Harbulot, George Friedman, Alain Bauer e John Robb. São bons trabalhos para este Verão, com personalidades da maior competência nas áreas da "intelligence", da guerra económica, da "antecipação", da estratégia e da geopolítica e, sobretudo, bons amigos da equipa intelNomics.


sexta-feira, 16 de julho de 2021

Os Próximos 20 Anos na Europa e no Mundo

A equipa Geopolitical Futures de George Friedman acaba de divulgar o seu "forecast" dos próximos 20 anos, "the road to 2040", um muito bem sustentado trabalho, numa perspectiva geopolítica, sobre o grande processo de mudança global em curso. As "novidades" não são simpáticas e apresentam-se como sendo, desde já, muito exigentes...

Alguns tópicos:

Sobre o aspecto principal da mudança em curso, "the dominant theme we see playing out over the course of the next 19 years is increasing disarray in Europe and Asia".

Sobre a evolução da Europa: "the European Union as an institution will collapse or redefine itself as a more modest trade zone encompassing a smaller part of the continent. The current free trade structure is unsustainable because its members, particularly Germany, have grown overly dependent on exports. This dependency makes these economies extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in demand outside of their own borders. Germany is the most vulnerable country and will experience economic decline due to inevitable fluctuations in the export market. Consequently, by 2040, Germany will be a second-tier power in Europe."

Sobre a relação transatlântica, "the U.S. will support its allies with supplies, training and some air power,  rather than directly and forcibly engaging."

A finalizar, "despite the growing unsteadiness in Eurasia, we also expect to see three regional powers emerge: Japan, Turkey and Poland. These countries will be outliers in an otherwise fragmented Eastern Hemisphere."

Todo o "sumário" deste "forecast" na foto abaixo. 

sábado, 2 de janeiro de 2021

Espionagem: George Friedman Equaciona “O Dilema da Inteligência”

A operação russa de ciber-espionagem nos USA, recentemente revelada, oferece a George Friedman a oportunidade de, com o olhar frio e a clareza de raciocínio habituais, esclarecer a imprescindível necessidade da “inteligência” (para qualquer governo responsável...) e os seus limites intrínsecos. É o que Friedman titula “o dilema da inteligência”.

The Intelligence Dilemma

George Friedman | Geopolitical Futures | December 22, 2020

The United States claims to have identified a massive Russian intelligence operation meant to gather secrets from corporations and the government. The line from Washington is that the operation was successful, but precisely what the Russians gathered has not been disclosed. That the operation was known makes it ineffective from Moscow’s point of view. So the Americans are scrambling to find out how much the Russians saw, and the Russians are scrambling to find out how long U.S. counterintelligence was aware of the operation.

George Friedman

The fact that it was announced recently doesn’t necessarily mean it was only recently detected, and that it was detected doesn’t necessarily mean the United States hasn’t been feeding Russia a trove of misinformation. It is therefore difficult to know who won and who lost. Espionage has always been a complex game, whether carried out by spies on the ground, or by hackers in a comfortable and secure office.

This is a timely reminder that not only do all nations engage in espionage but they are morally obligated to do so. Every government is responsible for national security. It is perhaps its highest obligation. In order to carry out the duty, it must know the capability and intentions of all governments, hostile or friendly. The saying that nations have no permanent friends or permanent enemies but only permanent interests means that leaders must be aware of what other leaders intend. It is essential that they dismiss the statements of the leaders of other nations, since those statements might be utterly sincere or profoundly deceptive. Any government must do all it can to determine the hidden intents and capabilities of others. And since friends can become enemies well before they issue a press release, intelligence is a practice of expecting the worst while hoping for the best. 

Moscow’s intelligence operations – now known as hacking – are thus a moral obligation of the Russian state. Moscow must know our intent and capabilities. Policies, the intent of foreign policy, rest in the White House. The capability to act frequently resides in American corporations. This operation by the Russians apparently went after both. The fact that the U.S. has not been caught undertaking an operation of such magnitude doesn’t mean it has not done so. The relative silence about any U.S. operations might be due to the fact that none have been detected. It might be due to the fact that the Russian government is hiding the intrusion in order to maintain domestic credibility. It may be that the Russians detected one and took control of the operations while pretending not to have noticed it. 

This much is unknown. What is certain is that the United States is as morally obligated to conduct espionage as the Russians and has prudently operated a vast and capable intelligence organization. The problem is that, as a citizen, I have no idea whether the U.S. intelligence establishment is capable of serving the national interest. I express confidence in that establishment based not on direct knowledge but rather on the assumption that at least some of the money allocated to the intelligence community has been put to good use. Even a fraction of the money spent should be enormously successful. And this is true for all nations, albeit with far more modest budgets. 

It is also true that all nations must be allowed to shroud their intelligence operations in secrecy and deception, a “bodyguard of lies” as it was once put. That we do not know how successful Russian hackers were, nor whether the exploit was penetrated months ago, is not the essential problem. All these operations fall in the realm of moral necessity, and I have no need to know. The problem arises from the assumption that the elected leaders of the country may not know how badly compromised the U.S. was by this action, or how badly the Russians were compromised. 

Thus is the moral dilemma of intelligence. We need an intelligence service to inform our leaders of the intent of other nations. And in any particular case, we can accept a bodyguard of lies. But U.S. intelligence is vast in terms of personnel and cost. It is also, by profession and law, required to act in secrecy. The entity that is charged with the most important thing this country has cannot readily be judged for competence by elected leaders, let alone by its citizens. 

A citizen needs to know that the U.S. is giving as good as it gets, and that China or Russia, each carrying out their duty to their nations, is feeling the righteous anger of the United States. I personally believe we are extremely good, but I don’t know for sure. I can’t know, nor can others, the degree to which our intelligence service is competent, acting within the laws that established it. Its missions are secret, yet that very secrecy forces us to be uncertain about all of these things. 

This is not unique to the United States nor to democracies. China has a vast intelligence service, and the Chinese Central Committee has only 200 members or so. They can’t know whether Chinese operatives are stealing technology for the use of the Chinese government, for the use of private Chinese corporations, or to sell to India. In theory, they are undoubtedly monitored, but there is a great deal of money that might be made in ignoring or manipulating them. The process of monitoring any intelligence agency in any country is the ancient Roman question: “Who will guard the guardians?” How can you prevent those monitoring secret operations from succumbing to greed, the most human of vices? 

In the United States, we confront this problem in two ways. One is to hold Congressional hearings in which the questioners have no idea what question to ask, nor any real idea whether the answers they get are in any way connected to the truth. The second is to create a new organization to monitor the operating service. Here, there are two choices. One is to appoint someone from outside the intelligence community, which replicates the Congressional dilemma. The other is to appoint an elder statesman from the community, who has invested his life in the service and who may be incapable of impartial and ruthless action. 

The most important question is effectiveness. All nations can ignore a measure of corruption if the national interest is served effectively. But how do we know whether the information provided to the president is accurate? In a world that is dangerous to Russia and the United States equally, the necessity of intelligence is obvious, as is the inability of the political leadership to oversee the vast expanse of intelligence operations. 

Stalin solved this problem by periodically killing members of his intelligence apparatus. It did not help him, and ultimately hurt him, but it made him feel better. Stalin, far more powerful than Putin, Xi or Trump, couldn’t be certain of his intelligence service. So dubious was he that he ignored their warning of a German invasion. Not trusting the intelligence service can be as calamitous as trusting it. 

Intelligence prior to the 20th century was important, but nothing like it is today. It now sprawls in all directions in all nations. The global nature of great power interests generates vast establishments that seem to multiply. We all face the same moral dilemma. We all want to protect our countries. We all reasonably distrust each other. We all build intelligence services generously. They must have a veil of trust, or they can’t work. But in each country, the question is asked: Are they actually competent, and do they tell us the truth? At some point, the solution will not sustain itself.

 https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-intelligence-dilemma/


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