Kahena: O Meu Romance do Ano

Foi um romance histórico, o “Kahena”, de Raouf Ofkir.

O autor não será (ao contrário do escriba indígena Saraiva) candidato ao Prémio Nobel da literatura. Mas sabe do que fala e sabe como falar, mesmo quando isso implica a coragem de ir frontalmente contra as narrativas dos dominadores e incorrer no risco de ser atingido por uma horda de “fatwas”.

Já conhecia alguns ensaios de Raouf Oufkir e tinha ouvido falar do seu romance histórico (que o levou, aliás, a fazer um mestrado em história). Mas nunca o tinha lido até que, sem termos falado, a Miss S., numa das suas passagens por Lisboa, mo trouxe como oferta surpresa. Maravilhosa ideia. Assim que lhe peguei nunca mais o larguei até o ter relido três vezes.

Oufkir carreia para o romance informação inédita (fruto de uma aturada investigação) que revela realidades cuja existência é ignorada e cuja ocultação é um objectivo prioritário e permanente das narrativas dominantes na matéria. Seria, aliás, muito interessante e oportuno, que o ensaísta e historiador Oufkir voltasse ao tema e publicasse um trabalho científico sobre uma realidade que ele agora conhece melhor do que ninguém. E que é urgente ser amplamente conhecida e reconhecida...

Mas não é só o conhecimento que as linhas do romance exalam que é surpreendente. Mais surpreendente ainda (se possível...) é a coragem revelada por Oufkir ao produzir quase a cada página uma prosa que arrisca uma “fatwa”. Um risco assustador, mesmo para um Raouf Oufkir.

Por muito menos (incomparavelmente menos...), o prémio Nobel da Literatura Salman Rushdie teve a sua “fatwa”. Mas para este marroquino, residente em França, a “fatwa” nunca chegou... Talvez por se chamar Oufkir, ser filho do velho general do mesmo nome (há muito falecido) e isso o tornar um alvo perigoso. Intocável ou quase, portanto. Mas, para quem passou quase metade da sua vida preso e isolado do mundo, a ameaça das “fatwas” islamistas talvez lhe provoque apenas um sorriso...

“Respeitinho é muito bonito” e, parece, que décadas depois de morto, o velho general que fez de Hassan II rei de Marrocos (até tentar depô-lo num golpe de generais republicanos) ainda impõe muito “respeitinho”. Porém e mesmo que assim seja, o risco que Raouf Oufkir escolheu correr, ao escrever os dois volumes deste “Kahena”, não é decisão ao alcance do comum dos mortais.

Nota 1: Entrevista breve de Raouf Ofkir sobre o romance “Kahene” e sobre a sua vida a um jornal de El-Jadida. 

Nota 2: Al-Jadida é a antiga praça-forte portuguesa de Mazagão, recheada de arquitectura e monumentos portugueses, recentemente recuperados com o apoio português. Orson Welles filmou partes do seu “Othelo” na chamada “cisterna portuguesa”. Uma cidade cuja visita recomendo e de que guardo óptimas memórias.

Explicitação da "strong National Security Strategy" de Trump, by Zalmay Khalilzad | TNI | Dec.26, 2017

A nova National Security Strategy americana, agora formalizada em documento pela Casa Branca, marca uma ruptura com a até agora dominante, em Washington, visão estratégica e seus discursos, dispositivos e objectivos. Esta nova NSS parte e apoia-se numa visão do mundo radicalmente diferente da que tem hegemonizado a política americana nas últimas décadas. Para os seus autores, se a "guerra fria" acabou há muito, também o pós-guerra fria acabou. "That brief unipolar era is over", como abaixo é dito, na explicitação (e defesa...) desta NSS desenvolvida pelo embaixador Zalmay Khalilzad, um especialista da Ásia e do mundo islâmico. Um ponto-chave desta NSS (que a distingue totalmente das anteriores) é a decisiva importância que atribue à "guerra económica" e à "guerra de informação" (ciber, incluído). Sublinhei as referências a estes dois pontos, no texto abaixo. Porque convem saber em que mundo vamos viver, nos próximos anos, vale a pena ler o que  Zalmay Khalilzad escreve.

Trump Has Unveiled a Strong National Security Strategy

Zalmay Khalilzad | TNI | Dec.26, 2017

The National Security Strategy has several strengths and is clear-eyed about world politics.

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy was released this week, and it can readily be distinguished from many previous such strategy documents. Often, these have been bottom-up aggregations of policies, which were basically just stapled together and labeled a strategy, but were not actual conceptual frameworks or orderings of priorities. The administration deserves credit for undertaking this strategy process early on. In fact, it is the first serious top-down, government-wide strategy produced since the well-known Defense Policy Guidance produced by the Pentagon in 1992, after the end of the Cold War. While the guidance was not embraced as a national security strategy by the George H. W. Bush administration, many of its concepts did shape subsequent strategy documents and policies.

Now to substance, and here I would assess that the Trump strategy has several strengths. First, it is clear-eyed about world politics and about where we currently are as a country. In 1992, we were at a unipolar moment at the end of the Cold War, the United States was preeminent, and the issue was how to consolidate that preeminence, preclude the rise of a global rival, and prevent the domination of critical regions by hostile powers.

That brief unipolar era is over. In critical regions, China, Russia and Iran now present competitive challenges to the United States and its allies and partners. North Korea is on the verge of being able to threaten American population centers with nuclear weapons. Regional and global trends have made many regions unstable, producing streams of refugees that in turn have had major political impacts. Threats from non-state actors such as international terrorists, at times sponsored by hostile states, have grown.

We contributed to all these developments, at times recklessly disengaging, at other times rushing forward with inadequately thought-through plans or failing to take advantage of golden-hour opportunities presented by our actions, and still in other instances failing to preclude emerging threats in a timely manner. These mistakes crossed party lines and involved both the executive and legislative branches. As a result, the balance of power in key regions shifted toward adversarial powers.

Second, the just-published strategy document addresses the perpetual debate in the United States about whether its foreign policy should be guided by the national interest or by the country’s values and ideals. In the Trump doctrine, reflective of a nation that is questioning the wisdom of recent international ventures, the balance has shifted in favor of interests, but it does not abandon values; instead, it calls for “principled realism.” By this, it means a policy of still advancing values, but with greater prudence.

Third, the strategy recognizes the centrality of improving the underpinnings of U.S. power, especially its economic performance. This is very important, as the United States cannot sustain its relative power position in the world if the bases of its power atrophy. The United States faces the fiscal challenge of supporting social programs and defense and international affairs spending at a time when the national debt and annual deficits are already high. We will not be able to manage this challenge without higher rates of economic growth. Whether it will be possible to reach and sustain three or four percent growth—the president’s goal—remains to be seen. However, if we stay at two percent or less, the United States will likely be forced to choose between domestic social programs and the U.S. world role, which is not a desirable choice to face. The National Security Strategy focus on the U.S. economy is sound.

The same is true with the document’s call for restoring U.S. military overmatch against potential adversaries. The 1992 Defense Policy Guidance called for the United States to maintain a military capability that would discourage the rise of a peer competitor. National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster is often quoted as saying that, since the end of the Cold War, any time we entered a military conflict it was not a fair fight and that preserving this overmatch must be a key security goal.

The diffusion of military technologies, particularly those of the precision-guidance revolution, means U.S. rivals are leveling the playing field. Sequestration, as well as congressional inability to pass regular appropriations bills, has badly undermined readiness and modernization. It will take perhaps a decade to repair the damage, and it’s high time to make a start.

Fourth, the document puts forward a sensible formula for relations with other great powers: counter disruptive actions, deter conflict and cooperate in areas of common interest. This recognizes that the purposes and goals of China and Russia are at odds with our own, but it also acknowledges that it is better to avoid conflict and that our interests are aligned on some important issues.

A sophisticated policy toward an adversarial power ought always to involve a mix of engagement and containment, or what I previously have termed “congagement.” The document rightly recognizes the importance of creating a favorable balance of power in critical regions to address the potential threat from competing powers. Conceptualizing the Indo-Pacific region as a geopolitical entity and strengthening ties with a rising India are smart policies.

Fifth, the new National Security Strategy is refreshingly blunt on some key regional issues. For example, it clearly calls out the destabilizing role that Pakistan has played in prolonging and complicating the Afghanistan conflict, by protecting, arming, and supporting the Taliban and other insurgents. Previous administrations allowed the Pakistani military to play a double game, receiving U.S. aid while undercutting U.S. efforts. This document should put them on notice that the United States what they are doing and are not willing to let it continue.

Sixth, the strategy points to the need for institutional change. From my personal experience as an ambassador in conflict zones, I can testify that our departments and agencies are not structured, staffed and integrated the way they should be to succeed in the missions assigned to them. The strategy document repeatedly emphasizes the need to renew and reform our policy instruments. It highlights the need for creating a more competitive diplomacy to advocate for U.S. interests.

Seventh, the Trump administration assigns the appropriate weight to information and data as a crucial new domain of competition. These new tools can affect competition through cyber offense and defense embedded in wider military operations. They shape economic competitiveness through theft of intellectual property and relative performance of firms by improving their productivity and efficiency. They have brought entirely new concerns and potential deformations to political contests through, for example, the weighting of messages in social media. There is also competition over who sets the rules that govern the structures and operations of the internet. The document’s identification of the importance of this issue accurately recognizes the new challenge before the United States.

At the same time, there are some elements of the strategy that may need to be revisited over time. It is gratifying, in light of the rhetoric of the campaign, that the president now embraces U.S. alliances and partnerships, though he—correctly—calls on the country’s partners to carry an equitable share of the burden of common defense. It remains to be seen whether, and in what form, he will preserve the idea of a community of democracies. The nature of regimes affects their behavior and reliability, a point that should not be lost to excessive pragmatism.

As a member of the board of the National Endowment of Democracy, I was struck at the demotion of democracy promotion in the document. Unsurprisingly, given the president’s views of the wars in Iraq and Libya, regime change is out for now. Challenging authoritarian regimes about their treatment of their own people also seems to be a lesser priority, though the president has spoken forcefully about the situation in Venezuela, and the document does tout the need to provide the world with an inspirational example and to collaborate with like-minded aspiring states.

As a country, we need an informed discussion about the means and limits of ideological influence and democracy expansion. We certainly don’t want to abandon those goals, but it is important to conduct a lessons-learned analysis based on our experiences that looks at whether we have been appropriately organized to carry out democracy promotion in the broader Middle East. Abandoning the effort altogether would not be right.

But with all of these positives, the bad news is that the hard part still lies ahead. A strategy is just a piece of paper until it is operationalized in policies, funded in the budget, and implemented on the ground. Reforming departments and agencies is even more challenging. Recently, the U.S. record in this part of the process has been spotty.

And, while the Trump administration has set its course in some areas, such as the strategy for Central and South Asia, it has a great deal of work to do in other areas, such as cybersecurity and funding a full restoration of U.S. military power. It knows where it’s going, but it still needs to roll out on many lines of action.

The National Security Strategy gives us a baseline to judge the administration’s performance going forward. Let us hope that the administration will deliver, as the president likes to say, ahead of schedule and under budget.

Zalmay Khalilzad, a former director of policy planning in the Department of Defense, was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations. He is the author of a new book: The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House: My Journey through a Turbulent World.

Image: U.S. President Donald Trump talks with members of the press during a lunch with bicameral tax conferees in the Cabinet Room of the White House in Washington D.C., U.S. December 13, 2017. REUTERS/Carlos Barria

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-has-unveiled-strong-national-security-strategy-23807?page=show

Nos 116 Anos de Marlene Dietrich

Do olhar, da voz e das pernas, o “Anjo Azul” fez uma arma terrível contra a Alemanha nazi.

Marlene em tournée de apoio às tropas americanas organizada pela OSS

Nasceu na Alemanha mas, ferozmente anti-nazi, naturalizou-se americana em 1939 e acabou por viver e morrer em Paris. Música, cantora e actriz, Marlene Dietrich, porém, sempre considerou o apoio às tropas americanas, durante a II Guerra, como o seu “most important job” (1).

Aquela que ficou conhecida como o “Anjo Azul” teve também uma vida amorosa muito rica (Joseph Kennedy e John Wayne são duas das muitas ligações que lhe são atribuídas) mas o grande amor da sua vida foi um herói da Resistência francesa (Médaille militaire e Croix de guerre) tornado um actor célebre depois da derrota da Alemanha, Jean Gabin.

Marlene Dietrich, o esplendor da diva

“The hottest pair of legs in Hollywood!... Million dollar legs” (“Darling, the legs aren’t so beautiful, I just know what to do with them”, Marlene dixit), abandonou definitivamente o mundo do espectáculo em 1974, justamente depois de ter partido uma perna, e recolheu à sua casa de Paris, onde a morte a foi visitar em 1992.

Marlene Dietrich... ‘Million dollar legs’,  by Milton Greene, Life, 1952

A voz que “fez” Lili Marlene completaria neste 27 de Dezembro 116 anos.

Marlene, doodle

Lili Marlene (vídeo):  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBi5j7yPwd0

(1) In 1944, the Morale Operations Branch of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) initiated the Muzak Project,^[15] musical propaganda broadcasts designed to demoralize enemy soldiers. Marlene Dietrich, the only performer who was told her recordings would be for OSS use, recorded a number of songs in German for the project, including Lili Marleen.^[16]

Dietrich also performed "Lili Marlene", as well as many other songs, live in Europe for Allied troops, often on rickety, makeshift stages.

"Lili Marleen" became a massive success, specifically on the German language OSS MO radio station Soldatensender, where it became the station's theme song.^[15] After its warm reception by the troops in Europe, the song was re-recorded and released, with the spelling "Lili Marlene" after her name, Marlene, with Charles Magnante on the accordion, citing him as the "orchestra director" for both it and the single's B-side, "Symphonie", sung in French. The single was released by Decca Records in 1945 on a 10" shellacgramophone record.^[17] The original OSS recording of "Lili Marleen" remains unreleased. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lili_Marleen 

Macron & Cª

Inquérito nos bastidores da "montagem" que levou Macron a sentar-se na cadeira de De Gaulle... Mas ainda só "em parte" diz sibilino o nosso amigo Franck DeCloquement, muito bem informado, como sempre. Uma leitura que se recomenda a quem tiver interesse (ou simples curiosidade) em saber como se pode fabricar, a partir de uma fraca figura, um candidato ganhador. Ou como a alquimia mediática transforma o chumbo em ouro...

Catalunha: Independentistas Têm Maioria Absoluta

Os títulos e sínteses das primeiras páginas dos jornais portugueses de hoje sobre as eleições na Catalunha parecem (quase, quase todos) “desenhados” por uma agência de comunicação de Rajoy. Pelos jornais europeus também é muito assim. Mesmo o Libération... Merecem mesmo o "Prémio Iznogoud"! 

 Para ter uma ideia do que realmente se passa é preciso ler... em inglês!

Catalan separatists won an absolute majority in the regional parliament

It was a blow for Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy, who called the election in hopes of calming the nation’s constitutional crisis...

Senhoras Nuas e iPhones Malandros

Senhoras e meninas, atenção ao que fazem com o vosso iPhone... Uma funcionalidade da Apple organiza numa espécie de pasta secreta as fotos femininas com muita pele à vista.

O aviso é da ‘Slate’:

Mesdames, votre iPhone contiendrait un dossier avec toutes vos photos dénudées

«ATTENTION LES FILLES!!! Allez dans vos photos et tapez “Brassiere”. Pourquoi est-ce qu'Apple enregistre ces photos et les classe dans un dossier?», s'indigne une utilisatrice de Twitter.

Et effectivement, si vous vous êtes prise en photo en petite tenue ou que votre girlfriend vous a envoyé quelques clichés intimes, bingo: elles se retrouveront toutes dans un seul et même dossier. Pratique pour certains. Terrifiant pour d'autres.

Vous voulez faire le test? Ouvrez votre galerie de photos, cliquez sur la petite loupe en haut à droite de votre écran et tapez le mot «Brassiere» (qui signifie «soutien-gorge» en anglais). Si votre iPhone est en français, il faudra a priori écrire «soutien-gorge» pour que cela fonctionne. Résultat? Si votre smartphone contient des photos dénudées, elles y apparaîtront toutes (à quelques exceptions près).

Sur Twitter, des centaines des personnes ont alors publié des captures d'écran de leur galerie photos (souvent floutée), comme preuve. Et n'ont pas manqué d'interpeler Apple.

http://www.slate.fr/story/153209/iphone-dossier-secret-nudes

Opacidade Financeira ou onde o dinheiro é realmente escondido

Esqueçam as listas e listinhas, mais ou menos de conveniência. Olhem para o mapa do índice de opacidade financeira e percebam que a realidade não é bem como contam as "fontes oficiais" e a imprensa main stream... Reparem como na Europa reina a opacidade e a... hipocrisia. Como também se pode ver o Líbano é o buraco mais escuro, mas é só, claro, para gente corajosa. O mapa é do mais recente e a sua  fonte está indicada no próprio mapa.

Alemanha: Que Falta de Memória... e de Vergonha!

Nota do Editor de ‘Intelnomics’: O texto abaixo, sobre as bancarrotas da Alemanha, no século XX, e o perdão da sua dívida pelos credores, chegou-nos por mail, sem indicação de autor. A matéria é, contudo, suficientemente relevante para aqui se registar.

A Alemanha foi o pior devedor do século XX. Só a sua insolvência dos anos 30 faz a actual dívida grega parecer uma coisa insignificante, explica Albrecht Ritschl, da London School of Economics: "No século XX, a Alemanha foi responsável pela maior bancarrota de que há memória". Um perdão dos credores permitiu à Alemanha não pagar a maior parte da dívida e ter várias dezenas de anos para, em suaves prestações ir liquidando o remanescente...

Assinatura em Londres do Acordo de Perdão das Dívidas da Alemanha, a 27 de Fevereiro de 1953.

Em 1953, a Alemanha de Konrad Adenauer entrou em default, falência, ficou Kaput, ou seja, ficou sem dinheiro para fazer mover a actividade económica do país. Tal qual como a Grécia actualmente. E, para a tirar do colapso, tudo ou quase tudo lhe foi perdoado!

A Alemanha negociou 16 mil milhões de marcos em dívidas de 1920 que entraram em incumprimento na década de 30 após o colapso da bolsa em Wall Street. O dinheiro tinha-lhe sido emprestado pelos EUA, pela França e pelo Reino Unido.

Outros 16 mil milhões de marcos diziam respeito a empréstimos dos EUA no pós-guerra, no âmbito do Acordo de Londres sobre as Dívidas Alemãs (LDA), de 1953. O total a pagar foi reduzido 50%, para cerca de 15 mil milhões de marcos, por um período de 30 anos, o que não teve quase impacto na crescente economia alemã.

O resgate alemão foi feito por um conjunto de países que incluíam a Grécia, a Bélgica, o Canadá, Ceilão, a Dinamarca, França, o Irão, a Irlanda, a Itália, o Liechtenstein, o Luxemburgo, a Noruega, o Paquistão, a Espanha, a Suécia, a Suíça, a África do Sul, o Reino Unido, a Irlanda do Norte, os EUA e a Jugoslávia.

As dívidas alemãs eram do período anterior e posterior à Segunda Guerra Mundial. Algumas decorriam do esforço de reparações de guerra e outras de empréstimos gigantescos norte-americanos ao governo e às empresas. Durante 20 anos, como recorda esse acordo, Berlim não honrou qualquer pagamento da dívida.

Por incrível que pareça, apenas oito anos depois de a Grécia ter sido invadida e brutalmente ocupada pelas tropas nazis, Atenas aceitou participar no esforço internacional para tirar a Alemanha da terrível bancarrota em que se encontrava.

Ora os custos monetários da ocupação alemã da Grécia foram estimados em 162 mil milhões de euros sem juros. Após a guerra, a Alemanha ficou de compensar a Grécia por perdas de navios bombardeados ou capturados, durante o período de neutralidade, pelos danos causados à economia grega, e pagar compensações às vítimas do exército alemão de ocupação.

As vítimas gregas foram mais de um milhão de pessoas (38 960 executadas, 12 mil abatidas, 70 mil mortas no campo de batalha, 105 mil em campos de concentração na Alemanha, e 600 mil que pereceram de fome). Além disso, as hordas nazis roubaram tesouros arqueológicos gregos de valor incalculável.

Qual foi a reacção da direita parlamentar alemã aos actuais problemas financeiros da Grécia? Segundo esta, a Grécia devia considerar vender terras, edifícios históricos e objectos de arte para reduzir a sua dívida.

Além de tomar as medidas de austeridade impostas, como cortes no sector público e congelamento de pensões, os gregos deviam vender algumas ilhas, defenderam dois destacados elementos da CDU, Josef Schlarmann e Frank Schaeffler, do partido da chanceler Merkel. Os dois responsáveis chegaram a alvitrar que o Partenon, e algumas ilhas gregas no Egeu, fossem vendidas para evitar a bancarrota.

"Os que estão insolventes devem vender o que possuem para pagar aos seus credores", disseram ao jornal "Bild". Depois disso, surgiu no seio do executivo a ideia peregrina de pôr um comissário europeu a fiscalizar permanentemente as contas gregas em Atenas.

O historiador Albrecht Ritschl, da London School of Economics, recordou recentemente à "Spiegel" que a Alemanha foi o pior país devedor do século XX. O economista destaca que a insolvência germânica dos anos 30 faz a dívida grega de hoje parecer insignificante.

"No século XX, a Alemanha foi responsável pela maior bancarrota de que há memória", afirmou. "Foi apenas graças aos Estados Unidos, que injectaram quantias enormes de dinheiro após a Primeira e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, que a Alemanha se tornou financeiramente estável e hoje detém o estatuto de locomotiva da Europa. Esse facto, lamentavelmente, parece esquecido", sublinha Ritsch.

O historiador sublinha que a Alemanha desencadeou duas guerras mundiais, a segunda de aniquilação e extermínio, e depois os seus inimigos perdoaram-lhe totalmente o pagamento das reparações ou adiaram-nas.

A Grécia não esquece que a Alemanha deve a sua prosperidade económica a outros países.

Por isso, alguns parlamentares gregos sugerem que seja feita a contabilidade das dívidas alemãs à Grécia para que destas se desconte o que a Grécia deve atualmente.

Fazem muito bem, mas e... os outros países vitimas do Nazismo?!

Foreign Policy: Como Portugal Disse "Não" à Alemanha e... Ganhou!

Para António Costa e Mário Centeno, um belo presente de Natal da americana Foreign Policy

PORTUGAL THE MAN. Lisbon got its economy back on track by ditching austerity, and now Berlin is eating crow

BY PAUL HOCKENOS | Foreign Policy | DECEMBER 18, 2017, 1:02 PM

New Eurogroup President Mário Centeno gestures as he addresses a press conference at the European Council in Brussels on Dec. 4. (John Thys/AFP/Getty Images)

Germany’s resolute Chancellor Angela Merkel is not usually one to admit she’s been wrong. But this autumn, when it comes to her faith in austerity economics in Europe, Merkel, together with her then-Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaüble, did as much — in deed, if not in word.

The Germans threw their hefty weight behind the leftist economist Mário Centeno, Portugal’s finance minister, for the coveted post of head of the Eurogroup, the common currency’s influential 19-member directorate. In January, Centeno, a Harvard-educated Portuguese Socialist Party freethinker, will leave Lisbon’s left-wing government to succeed the incumbent president, Jeroen Dijsselbloem. The Dutchman had been a critical ally of Germany in recent years, taking to task the profligate Southern Europeans — and inadvertently ripping open a contentious divide between Europe’s north and south that persists to today.

Centeno constitutes a shift in course. Until now, he has represented a Southern European country, Portugal, that received a 78 billion euro ($92 billion) bailout from its fellow European Union member states amid the euro crisis. But even more remarkable, Centeno was part of a leftist government with the backing of a communist party, which subsequently bucked the marching orders of its northern creditors and the troika composed of the European Central Bank, European Commission, and International Monetary Fund.

Whether Centeno’s ascension, with Berlin’s assistance, represents a shift in German economic thinking remains to be seen. Less than two years ago, Schaüble, the eurozone’s fiercest fiscal hawk, warned Portugal that its refusal to follow the rules would sink its economy and force it to seek another international bailout. But, since then, Lisbon’s cautiously renegade deviations have won plaudits even from budget disciplinarians — including Schaüble himself.

Portugal has proven it’s possible for a struggling country to defy German-imposed austerity in the EU and still succeed

Portugal has proven it’s possible for a struggling country to defy German-imposed austerity in the EU and still succeed. That’s not to suggest that, just because Centeno has served a leftist Portuguese government, he will pursue radical policy ambitions in Brussels. But, as president of the Eurogroup, he will execute duties in a body that grew immensely in significance over the course of the financial crises and will be paramount in guiding the reform processes that still lie ahead.

The Eurogroup was initially designed as an informal meeting for finance ministers to exchange views, but now it monitors draft national budgets and bailout programs as part of the economic surveillance instituted as a result of the crises. The president is a key figure in eurozone developments even though the body has been starkly criticized as nontransparent and undemocratic, as it is not subject to parliamentary discretion, nor are its minutes public.

Centeno, like the Portuguese government he served, already symbolizes the possibility that a new, less German, ideological era of economic governance is in the offing in Europe. Lisbon is the first Southern European government to climb out of the swamp of indebtedness and stagnation. Its economy is undergoing its fastest expansion in over a decade, and more growth is expected next year, which will shrink the country’s budget deficit to 1 percent of GDP — the slightest in 40 years. Unemployment this year fell to 9.2 percent, down from 17.5 percent in 2013, and exports are picking up. (Nevertheless, Portugal’s national debt is still 128 percent of its current GDP, a sign that it is not entirely out of the woods yet.)

“Mr. Centeno’s appointment is representative of a policy change in the workings of the eurozone,” said Gustav Horn, an economist at the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, a German think tank. “It’s an admission that the hard-line austerity prescriptions and fiscal contraction haven’t worked, which we can see in Greece. Cutting spending and taxes in times of crisis only make things worse.

Portugal’s approach was different: first get the economy going, then get the budget right. Merkel has now obviously recognized this.”

Portugal’s path back to the family of healthy European economies wasn’t anywhere in sight when, in 2010, Portugal stumbled into the debt trap and downward spiral that also captured many of its indebted southern European peers. The introduction of the euro 11 years prior had diminished the competitiveness of a country accustomed to tampering with its currency’s value in order to gain favorable trading terms. It also provided Portugal with easy access to almost unlimited credit — which went largely toward property, construction projects, and high-risk financial products. GDP grew. But when the bubble burst and the time to pay came around, Portugal went belly up like the others, outing a legacy of mismanagement, jiggered accounting, and public sector waste.

But when the bubble burst and the time to pay came around, Portugal went belly up

To stave off bankruptcy, Portugal signed up for a bailout in 2011. That came with familiar instructions to cut the budget deficit, lower wages and retirement benefits, reduce public spending, and in general comply with the EU’s fiscal policy conditions. Portugal’s conservative government at the time dutifully instituted tax hikes and salary cuts for public servants, four national holidays were scratched, and many utilities were privatized. Over two years, the country’s education budget was slashed by 23 percent. Predictably, unemployment soared as the economy ground to a halt.

The upshot was that in 2015 a Socialist Party minority government came to power under the veteran social democrat António Costa with the nod of the Portuguese Communist Party, Greens, and independent Marxists in the parliament — a breathtaking novelty. Costa’s administration came into office having witnessed the unsightly defeat of a Greek government lead by the like-minded Syriza party, which had rejected outright the troika’s terms and then capitulated under pressure, facing a bitter choice between either insolvency (and crashing out of the euro) or compliance.

On the campaign trail, Costa, Lisbon’s mayor at the time, spoke vaguely about challenging the austerity regime without undermining the troika’s framework — in contrast to Syriza’s uncompromising stance. In office, Costa’s government appointed Centeno to the finance ministry.

Centeno was given a mandate to steer economic reforms — and, crucially, to kick-start the economy by bolstering demand

Working in Portugal’s central bank and teaching at the University of Lisbon, the 51-year-old labor market specialist hadn’t been in the spotlight until Costa called on him to design the Socialist Party’s economic platform for the 2015 election campaign. In academic circles, he had the reputation of a liberal favoring labor market flexibility. In office, he proved to be a shooting star: 2017 surveys showed him as the Cabinet’s most popular minister, with Portuguese voters obviously crediting him with putting the economy back on its feet.

Centeno was given a mandate to steer economic reforms — and, crucially, to kick-start the economy by bolstering demand.

“It’s completely wrong to think that a country like Portugal could become more competitive on the basis of Third World competitive factors,” Costa told the Financial Times in January 2016, referring to the troika-dictated intension to boost productivity by deflating wages. The government stuck largely to the troika’s fiscal terms while reversing pension and salary cuts, stopping privatization of public water and transport companies, and reinstating the holidays. In spite of reprimands from the troika, it bumped up the minimum wage and scuppered the regressive tax hike. Social security was increased for poor families.

Despite the threats and doomsday prophesies from EU officials, the measures rekindled domestic demand and investment in 2016. Growth became steady. A year after assuming office, Costa’s government with a leftist menagerie behind it could flaunt a 13 percent leap in corporate investment. “Portugal has increased public investment, reduced the deficit, slashed unemployment and sustained economic growth,” Guardian columnist Owen Jones wrote earlier this year. “We were told this was impossible and, frankly, delusional.” In September, Portugal regained investment-grade credit status from international rating agencies.

Centeno’s posting to lead the Eurogroup now lines up adroitly with French President Emmanuel Macron’s reform agenda. Macron can most probably count on Centeno as an ally in tying the euro area’s economies more closely together and kick-starting growth on the troubled southern economies with an investment strategy. Greece remains a major concern for the zone, as its economy has not responded positively to the Schaüble-era reforms. The body will certainly discuss easing the measures imposed in Greece during the height of the debt crisis.

For this reason, the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore commented: “Centeno’s election can be seen as a turning point.” It will prove all the more so if Centeno, and his anti-austerity reformism, continues to have the backing of Germany — and that will, in turn, be more likely if the next German governing coalition includes the Social Democrats, which seems increasingly likely.

To be sure, no one in Germany is apologizing about the straightjackets they insisted Europe’s debtors don. But the important thing isn’t whether Merkel goes on the public record crying “mea culpa.” Taking stock of Portugal’s achievement and easing up on the debtor countries — foremost Greece — would be compensation enough.

Paul Hockenos is a Berlin-based journalist. His recent book is Berlin Calling: A Story of Anarchy, Music, the Wall and the Birth of the New Berlin (The New Press).

Coisa Nunca Vista: Putin agradece à CIA e a Trump!

Quem te avisa teu amigo é e, portanto, deves-lhe agradecer. Vladimir Putin seguiu a velha sabedoria popular e agradeceu a Trump a informação que lhe permitiu impedir um ataque do Daesh à catedral de S. Petersburgo e prender os islamistas envolvidos na operação terrorista. Além de agradecer a Trump ainda lhe pediu que transmitisse o seu “obrigado” aos homens da CIA que tinham obtido e transmitido a informação.

Foi o próprio Kremlin que divulgou a informação posteriormente confirmada pela Casa Branca. Gente bem educada é realmente outra coisa!

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/893566/donald-trump-russia-vladimir-putin-cia-terror-attack-isis

Livros para o Natal: 11 books the US Army's top officer recommends to help understand the world

Livros na árvore de Natal ou no sapatinho é coisa que fica sempre bem e resolve com vantagem alguma indecisão. Portanto, aqui ficam algumas sugestões. A equipa do Intelnomics quebra hoje a sua tradição na recomendação de leituras... Desta vez, "esquecemos" as nossas leituras e fazemos nossas as reomendações do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas americanas. Porque achamos conveniente divulgar o que o E-M das FA americanas consideram que vale a pena ser lido e que visões do mundo isso transporta. Para a Páscoa, voltamos com as sugestões de leitura da equipa Intelnomics.


Bons e inteligentes livros, Boas leituras, Bom Natal e o Melhor Ano Novo 2018.


"11 books the US Army's top officer recommends to help understand the world 

Christopher Woody | Dec. 7, 2017, 10:04 AM





US Army Gen. Mark Milley at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on his nomination to be Army chief of staff, July 21, 2015.Thomson Reuters

Secretary James Mattis has been heralded as a "warrior monk" for his prodigious knowledge and voracious reading habits. But Mattis, a retired Marine general, is not the only US military officer who has supplemented his martial knowledge with academic achievement.

In that spirit, the US Army has distributed reading recommendations so soldiers and civilians alike are able "to sharpen their knowledge of the Army’s long and distinguished history, as well as the decisive role played by landpower in conflicts across the centuries."

Below are some of the books recommended by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley to help better understand the world's current strategic environment, along with his explanations for their inclusion.


"A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order," by Richard Haass

"Haass argues for an updated global operating system—call it world order 2.0—that reflects the reality that power is widely distributed and that borders count for less."



"Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century," by P.W. Singer

"Blending historical evidence with interviews of an amazing array of individuals, [Singer] shows how technology is changing not just in how wars are fought, but also in the politics, economics, laws, and the ethics that surround war itself."



"The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," by John J. Mearsheimer

"Contending that states throughout history have been driven to acquire greater power and influence as a means of guaranteeing their own security, [Mearsheimer] concludes that current efforts at engagement and seeking harmonious relations between states will ultimately fail and predicts that the U.S. security competition with a rising China will inevitably intensify."



"The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000," by Paul Kennedy

Kennedy's "far-ranging survey explores the relationship between economics, strategy, technology, and military power. He argues for the primacy of economic factors to explain why some states achieved great power status. By the same token, nations stumbled and declined when their financial resources could no longer support their military ambitions and commitments."



"No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn," by Charles A. Kupchan

"Between 1500 and 1800, the West sprinted ahead of other centers of power in Asia and the Middle East. ... Today, that preeminence is in decline as China, India, Brazil, and other emerging powers rise. Kupchan considers how those principles associated with the West — democracy, capitalism, and secular nationalism — will continue to endure as new states outside the Western world gain greater economic and political prominence."



"The Future of Power," by Joseph Nye Jr.

"This exploration of the changing nature of power considers the dramatic role that the Internet and information technologies have played in redefining how nations project power and influence."



"The Future of Land Warfare," by Michael O'Hanlon

O'Hanlon "wonders where large-scale conflicts or other catastrophes are most plausible. Which of these could be important enough to require the option of a U.S. military response? And which of these could, in turn, demand significant numbers of American ground forces for their resolution? He is not predicting or advocating big American roles in such operations — only cautioning against overconfidence that the United States can and will avoid them."



"The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder," by Peter Zeihan

"Zeihan examines how the hard rules of geography are eroding the American commitment to free trade; how much of the planet is aging into a mass retirement that will enervate markets and capital supplies; and how, against all odds, it is the ever-ravenous American economy that — alone among the developed nations — is rapidly approaching energy independence. He concludes that geography will matter more than ever in a deglobalizing world and that America’s geography is simply sublime."



"Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq," by Louis A. DiMarco

"In this masterful study of urban warfare, DiMarco explains what it takes to seize and hold a city literally block by block and provides lessons for today’s tacticians that they neglect at their own peril."



"The Future Declassified: Megatrends That Will Undo the World Unless We Take Action," by Matthew Burrows

"Burrows examines recent trends to forecast tectonic shifts that will drive us to 2030. A staggering amount of wholesale change is happening — from unprecedented and widespread aging to rampant urbanization and growth in a global middle class to an eastward shift in economic power and a growing number of disruptive technologies."



"Great Powers and Geopolitical Change," by Jakub J. Grygiel

"In an era of high technology and instant communication, the role of geography in the formation of strategy and politics can be undervalued. ... In a series of case studies, Grygiel, a political scientist, highlights the importance of incorporating geography into grand strategy. He argues that states can increase and maintain their position of power by pursuing a geostrategy that focuses on control of resources and lines of communications."

The Last Jedi... Um sinal do tempo

The Last Jedi, oitavo episódio da saga “star wars”, parece ser mais “wars” e menos “star”, como alguém já disse, acabando por ser um verdadeiro filme de guerra e não, como nos bons tempos do velho Lucas, um afrontamento, antes de tudo, espiritual entre o bem e o mal. O The Last Jedi escolhe,  entre o bem e o mal, o “cinzento”, isto é, recusa-se a escolher. 

Sinal dos tempos... e também da ausência da magia própria de George Lucas.

Star Wars, o cartaz que não irá aparecer...

A saga já é quarentona e, nos seus 8 episódios, é visível que a percepção dos conflitos se vai modificando e acompanhando a evolução da realidade do nosso mundo, desde o tempo de Reagan e da Guerra Fria até agora, a Trump e a uma “paz” cada vez mais “quente”. 

“Les yeux du monde” divulgam agora uma síntese muito interessante sobre essa evolução.


Évolution de la perception des conflits dans Star Wars

Fabien HERBERT

Il y a bien longtemps, dans une galaxie lointaine, très lointaine, une république démocratique se transformait en un «Empire autoritariste». Les derniers partisans de la République décident alors de résister et de former une rébellion. 

Voici brièvement le contexte politique de la saga cinématographique «Star Wars». De nombreuses analyses sont déjà parues sur cette succession d’histoires, du passage de la démocratie à la dictature et au totalitarisme, qui nous mettent en garde pour l’avenir de nos systèmes politiques occidentaux. La saga Star Wars a donc déjà été étudiée sous l’angle de la politique, mais qu’en est-il des relations entre les différentes forces qui s’affrontent et comment les conflits sont-ils présentés dans les différents films? Star Wars n’est pas une saga qui cherche à ré-inventer un système politique mondial, elle tend plutôt à refléter des situations existantes et à les intégrer dans un univers fictif. Le créateur de la saga, George Lucas, n’est évidemment pas étranger à ce traitement des forces centrifuges dans ses films. Le réalisateur est très intéressé par les processus politiques comme l’illustre sa célèbre critique contre l’industrie cinématographique américaine: «les réalisateurs soviétiques avaient plus de liberté que moi». Il faut avoir une certaine vision du monde pour prononcer cette phrase aux États-Unis. Ce n’est cependant pas la vente des droits de l’auteur à la société Disney qui empêchera Star Wars de nous présenter le reflet de nos propres perceptions en termes de conflictualités. La sortie en décembre 2016 de «Rogue One: A Star Wars Story» illustre bien cette continuité, puisque la célèbre licence présente une nouvelle configuration du conflit entre l’Empire et les rebelles. 

La saga des années 1980 (Episodes IV, V et VI)

Star Wars et la Guerre Froide dans le ‘Time’

La première saga Star Wars, sortie entre 1977 et 1983, retrace le parcours d’un jeune Jedi, Luke Skywalker, et d’une rébellion qui veut renverser l’Empire galactique, un régime politique totalitaire. Cette série de trois films est certainement la plus manichéenne de l’univers Star Wars et pour cause, elle est contemporaine d’une période historique elle-même très manichéenne.

Cette période historique, c’est bien évidemment la Guerre froide. Pour comprendre l’ancrage que peut avoir cette saga dans le contexte politique de l’époque, il est utile de reprendre les termes du Président américain Ronald Reagan, élu en 1980.

Dans un discours de 1983, alors que la crise des euromissiles bat son plein en Europe, le Président élu rappelle qu’il ne faut pas mettre au même niveau les États-Unis et l’URSS et ne pas «ignorer les faits de l’Histoire et les tendances agressives d’un empire du mal» et donc continuer «la lutte entre le bon et le mauvais, le bien et le mal». L’URSS est donc désigné comme l’empire du mal. Enfin le même Ronald Reagan mettra en place en 1983 (toujours dans le contexte des euromissiles), un projet de défense anti-missile nommé «Initiative de défense stratégique» , plus connu sous le nom de «Star Wars» dans les médias américains. Cette image de lutte Est/Ouest collera à la Guerre des étoiles jusqu’à la chute de l’Union Soviétique en 1991. Si G.Lucas s’est inspiré des totalitarismes pour créer son «Empire galactique» c’est plutôt le régime nazi qui était visé à l’origine, le créateur de Star Wars a lui-même avoué qu’il y transposait également une critique de la politique impériale américaine. Il y a donc un décalage entre ce que le film et son créateur voulaient véhiculer et la manière dont il a été interprété et utilisé dans un contexte politique particulier.

Aujourd’hui, lorsque l’on parle de la première saga, nous sommes revenus à une lecture de l’Empire galactique plus proche du régime nazi, car l’URSS n’existe plus, mais surtout parce que le régime nazireprésente un traumatisme bien plus grand pour nos sociétés «occidentales» (1) que l’empire soviétique. Dans les films suivants, les rapports de force et la nature même des acteurs évolueront logiquement, puisque notre monde aura fortement changé entre le début des années 80 et les années 2000.


La saga des années 2000 (Episode I, II et III)

C’est certainement à propos de cette saga qu’il y aurait le plus de choses à dire. Premièrement, ce sont dans les épisodes I, II et III que l’on comprend davantage les enjeux politiques de l’univers Star Wars, avec le basculement dans l’épisode III d’une République démocratique vers un Empire totalitaire. En parallèle, le contexte géopolitique a évolué, avec notamment la chute de l’URSS qui était un thème structurant de la trilogie des années 1980. Ainsi il n’y a plus de Guerre Froide et l’épisode I (1999) de cette nouvelle saga s’apparente aux systèmes politiques occidentaux des années 2000, c’est-à-dire à une paix démocratique. Cependant, une force politique antagoniste à la République existe déjà, avant l’arrivée de l’Empire. Il s’agit de la Fédération du commerce, qui fait elle-même partie d’une formation séparatiste nommée: la Confédération des systèmes indépendants. Deux nouveaux thèmes font donc leur apparition: l’économie et l’indépendantisme.

Le thème commercial émerge dans la «prélogie» Star Wars alors que le conflit capitalisme/communisme est terminé, remporté par le premier camp. En 1995, l’Organisation mondiale du commerce fait son apparition et G. Lucas va prendre en compte les motivations économiques des États dans leurs rapports aux conflits, comme ce fut le cas lors de la Guerre du Golfe (1990/1991). On pourrait aller plus loin en imaginant que le rôle néfaste de la Fédération du commerce dans Star Wars fait écho à l’impact de l’économie de marché dans nos démocraties. Pour ce qui est de la Confédération des systèmes indépendants, elle illustre a priori les mouvements indépendantistes issus de l’URSS et de la Yougoslavie. Notons qu’à la sortie de «Star Wars, épisode I: La Menace fantôme» en 1999, la guerre du Kosovo est à son paroxysme.

Cependant, le traitement négatif du séparatisme dans Star Wars diverge des postures occidentales de l’époque, qui étaient plutôt favorables à ces indépendantismes. L’auteur avait peut être à cette époque une perception différente de ces mouvements. Enfin pour revenir à la Fédération du commerce, il s’agit là d’une force séparatiste, qui veut s’affranchir des règles fixées par la République et donc par la démocratie. Il serait donc possible d’y voir un parallèle avec «l’ultra-libéralisme», qui propose une économie fondée sur la dérégulation et la non-intervention des États.

Les premiers films du milieu des années 2010 (Episode VII et «Rogue One»)

Concernant les deux films sortis en 2015 et 2016, il est nécessaire de rappeler le changement de direction, puisque George Lucas a vendu sa licence «Star Wars» à la société Disney en 2012. Les derniers films sont donc écrits par une super-production, mais cette lecture des perceptions de la guerre dans les films Star Wars peut tout de même évoluer, notamment avec le film sorti en décembre 2016: «Rogue One: A Star Wars Story». Ce film se déroule juste avant l’épisode IV, ainsi on peut retrouver certains personnages mythiques, comme Dark Vador ou la princesse Leïa Organa. Le contexte politique est à peu près le même que dans la première trilogie, ce qui justifie un peu plus la problématique de l’article, car le traitement du conflit Empire/rebelles est nettement différent. Ainsi dans ce dernier opus, les producteurs ont ré-actualisé la lutte entre l’Empire galactique et la rébellion en y ajoutant un troisième camp : ce lui des rebelles «extrémistes». Il ne s’agit pas d’une simple évocation dans le film, mais bien d’un enjeu majeur, puisque la première partie du film se concentre sur ce thème.

Les protagonistes du film (les rebelles modérés) ayant pour mission de retrouver le leader d’une mouvance rebelle extrémiste et à le faire revenir à une position plus mesurée afin qu’il réintègre la rébellion. Nous passons donc du schéma d’un conflit entre deux belligérants pour la saga des années 1980, à un schéma plus complexe dans Rogue One. Si les deux camps rebelles ne s’affrontent pas ouvertement, ils sont suffisamment éloignés dans leurs opinions politiques pour ne pas s’unir réellement.

Cette situation est assez proche des guerres que l’on connaît actuellement, elle reflète tout du moins nos perceptions de ces conflits. Pour développer notre analyse, utilisons l’exemple de la Syrie, on pourrait également prendre celui de l’Irak, du Yémen ou de la Tchétchénie. Schématisons cette analogie entre Star Wars et la situation en Syrie: s’affrontent sur le terrain, un gouvernement légitimiste mené par Bachar al-Assad, que l’on peut comparer dans Star Wars à l’Empire, et des rebelles syriens (Armée Syrienne Libre) qui s’apparentent à la rébellion menée par la princesse Leïa, ainsi que des formations Djihadistes (Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, pour nommer la plus puissante) représentées par «la rébellion extrémiste». Pour conclure cette analogie, il est intéressant de voir que dans une scène de combat entre rebelles extrémistes et stormtroopers de l’Empire, un de ces derniers qualifie les rebelles de «terroristes». Un qualificatif largement utilisé aujourd’hui dans la communication des États en difficulté, voire défaillants, face à des armées rebelles (Syrie, Yémen, Ukraine).

Si les logiques conflictuelles existantes sont traduites de manière bancale et stéréotypée dans les films Star Wars, ce n’est pas tant la faute des producteurs, que celle de la représentation erronée de ces conflits dans les sociétés occidentales. Dans une perspective qui chercherait à transcrire notre vision des rapports politiques et géopolitiques mondiaux, Star Wars se révèle être la saga cinématographique de science-fiction la plus ambitieuse de son époque.

(1) Dans l’article, le monde occidental est évoqué de manière homogène. En effet, nous n’aurions pas le temps pour ce type de format de traiter la perception de chaque État occidental, il faut donc s’appuyer sur une perception générale. Cette démarche peut présenter des inconvénients, par exemple lorsqu’il est question d’un jugement subjectif des traumatismes liés au nazisme ou au soviétisme en Occident: si le traumatisme nazi est plus fort en Europe de l’ouest, certains pays de l’ancien bloc soviétique sont bien plus traumatisés par l’URSS que l’Allemagne nazie (comme les pays Baltes).

‘Relatório Piketty’: A Desigualdade É a Questão-Chave do Nosso Tempo

A negativa evolução da desigualdade de rendimentos é hoje a questão-chave nas instâncias do económico, do social, do político e mesmo do eleitoral (como bem se viu na vitória eleitoral de Trump contra todos os prognósticos, convicções e outras "certezas" dos “especialistas” e dos media...). Este trabalho do Piketty et alia demonstra-o de modo notável e torna o tema incontornável.

Vale a pena notar que toda a política “europeia” imposta por Markel (política de saque e de pauperização dos Estados da fachada marítima da Europa) potencia e implementa a desigualdade no interior da “União”, desenvolvendo ainda mais as assimetrias entre Estados-membros, numa autêntica política de "guerra económica", e vai frontalmente contra tudo o que é defendido neste “relatório Piketty”

World Wealth and Income Database

Between 1980 and 2016, #inequality rose almost everywhere in the world, but at different speeds (here the top 10% income share)


See the complete World Inequality Report here 👇 http://wir2018.wid.world