Escândalo do Facebook Assusta Pequim

Um ponto de vista de Pequim sobre o escândalo do Facebook… Muito interessante e revelador. 

 

Facebook: o maior assalto de sempre à privacidade...
 
Preventing the Balkanization of the Internet

by A. Michael Spence | CFR | March 28, 2018  | This post is co-authored by Fred Hu, Chairman and Founder of Primavera Capital Group, a China-based global investment firm.

Facebook's Cambridge Analytica scandal is just the latest example of the risks associated with the Internet—and why stronger regulation is more important than ever. With the entire global economy becoming inextricably linked to the Internet and digital technologies, stronger regulation is more important than ever. But if that regulation is fragmented, clumsy, heavy-handed, or inconsistent, the consequences for economic integration—and, in turn, prosperity—could be severe.

BEIJING—The recent revelation that more than 50 million Facebook profiles were harvested by app and given to political consultancy Cambridge 
Analytica has produced a backlash against the platform. But it is just the latest example of the risks associated with the Internet, which forms the core of today’s digital revolution.

Most of the digital innovations that have reshaped the global economy over the last 25 years rely on network connectivity, which has transformed commerce, communication, education and training, supply chains, and much more. Connectivity also enables access to vast amounts of information, including information that underpins machine learning, which is essential to modern artificial intelligence.

Over the last 15 years or so, mobile Internet has reinforced this trend, by rapidly increasing not just the number of people who are connected to the Internet, and thus able to participate in the digital economy, but also the frequency and ease with which they can connect. From GPS navigation to ride-sharing platforms to mobile-payment systems, on-the-go connectivity has had a far-reaching impact on people’s lives and livelihoods.

For years, it was widely believed that an open Internet—with standardized protocols but few regulations—would naturally serve the best interests of users, communities, countries, and the global economy. But major risks have emerged, including monopoly power for mega-platforms like Facebook and Google; vulnerability to attacks on critical infrastructure, including financial-market systems and electoral processes; and threats to privacy and the security of data and intellectual property. Fundamental questions about the Internet’s impact on political allegiance, social cohesion, citizen awareness and engagement, and childhood development also remain.

As the Internet and digital technologies penetrate economies and societies more deeply, these risks and vulnerabilities become increasingly acute. And, so far, the predominant approach to managing them in the West—self-regulation by the companies that provide the services and own the data—does not seem to be working. Major platforms can’t be expected to remove “objectionable” content, for example, without guidelines from regulators or courts.

Given this, we seem to be facing a new transition from the open Internet of the past to one subject to more extensive control. But this process carries risks of its own.

Though there is a strong case for international cooperation, such an approach seems unlikely in the current climate of protectionism and unilateralism. It is not even clear that countries will agree to treaties banning cyber warfare. Even if some semblance of international cooperation were mustered, non-state actors would continue to act as spoilers—or worse.

Against this background, it seems likely that new regulations will be initiated largely by individual states, which will have to answer difficult questions. Who is responsible—and liable—for data security? Should the state have access to user data, and for what purposes? Will users be allowed to maintain anonymity online?

Countries’ answers to such questions will vary widely, owing to fundamental differences in their values, principles, and governance structures. For example, in China, the authorities filter content deemed to be inconsistent with state interests; in the West, by contrast, there is no entity with legitimate authority to filter content, except in extreme cases (for example, hate speech and child pornography). Even in areas where there does seem to be some consensus—such as the unacceptability of disinformation or of foreign meddling in electoral processes—there is no agreement on the appropriate remedy.

The lack of consensus or cooperation could lead to the emergence of national digital borders, which would not only inhibit flows of data and information, but also disrupt trade, supply chains, and cross-border investment. Already, most US-based technology platforms cannot operate in China, because they cannot or will not accept the authorities’ rules about state access to data and control over content.

Meanwhile, the US has blocked the Chinese company Huawei from investing in software startups, providing network equipment to wireless carriers, or (along with ZTE) selling mobile phones in the US market, owing to the firm’s alleged ties to the Chinese government. Huawei and ZTE both maintain that their activities are purely commercial, and that they play by the rules wherever they operate, but US officials continue to insist that the companies pose a security risk.

By contrast, nearly all European countries, including the United Kingdom, are receptive to Huawei and ZTE, both of which are major players in Europe. Yet Europe is creating its own barriers, with new data-protection and privacy rules that may well impede the application of machine learning. Unlike China and the US, Europe is not yet home to a mega-platform of the type that is leading the way in machine-learning innovations.

With the entire global economy becoming inextricably linked to the Internet and digital technologies, stronger regulation is more important than ever. But if that regulation is fragmented, clumsy, heavy-handed, or inconsistent, the consequences for economic integration—and, in turn, prosperity—could be severe.

Before the world adopts ineffective or counterproductive solutions, policymakers should think carefully about how best to approach regulation. If we cannot agree on every detail, perhaps we can at least identify a set of shared principles that can form the basis of multilateral agreements that proscribe destructive activity such as the misuse of data, thereby helping to preserve an open global economy.

https://www.cfr.org/blog/preventing-balkanization-internet

Facebook à Beira do Abismo

Shah Gilani, um experiente e muito bem sucedido consultor de investimentos (e também uma das nossas habituais FBI's, fontes bem informadas), antecipa um futuro negro para o Facebook…

The Facebook Fiasco and Its Future

Facebook likely violated a 2011 consent agreement with the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) to safeguard users' personal information and could be subject to trillions of dollars in fines.

by Shah Gilani

Facebook Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB) is in a heap of trouble.

Users are deleting their accounts and threatening a class-action suit.

Advertisers could pull back in droves.

Congress wants CEO Mark Zuckerberg to testify before them.

U.K. regulators could file charges against the company.

And, worst of all, Facebook likely violated a 2011 consent agreement with the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) to safeguard users' personal information and could be subject to trillions of dollars in fines.

Here's the fiasco facing Facebook, what it means for its once highflying stock price, and the far more insidious things that are going on behind the scenes.

Zuck Let Hackers into His Network

What looks like a new problem is actually Facebook’s business model.

The current firestorm in front of Facebook, which over the past two weeks knocked $100 billion off the company’s equity value, centers around British data-mining company, Cambridge Analytica.

Cambridge Analytica’s co-founder, Christopher Wylie, for reasons no one’s sure about, blew the whistle on his company after they got 270,000 Facebook users’ information (obtained legally with their consent). Then through those users, the company illegally acquired personal data on 50 million of their Facebook friends.

Rather than mining all that information to figure out how to hard-target advertisements to users, Cambridge used personal data to create “psychographic profiles” to target users with political ads, news, and who knows what else, to try to influence how they might vote in elections.

Cambridge sold data to Donald Trump’s campaign, to the “Vote Yes on Brexit” campaign, to politicians in Kenya, and probably other political entities around the world.

The outrage over Facebook letting Cambridge “hack” into its databases, as Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg called the breech, is what’s front and center today. What Cambridge did, with whom, to what ends, and how effective it may have been is another story.

#DeleteFacebook

Facebook’s in trouble because its business model includes allowing advertisers and others access to its databases. That’s how they sell tens of billions of dollars’ worth of ads a year. Facebook is paid by advertisers because of their ability to target ads.

That’s all fine and good when someone’s trying to sell a pair of sneakers or a vacation package; not when someone’s trying to influence democratic processes – like voting.

High profile Facebook users like Elon Musk, his Tesla Inc. (NasdaqGS:TSLA) car company and his SpaceX company have publicly deleted their Facebook pages. So has Playboy. There’s a huge #DeleteFacebook movement.

Facebook’s earnings come out in early May. We’ll see then what’s happened to user engagement, total subscribers, and to ad revenue.

If they’re all off, and they could be, Facebook’s stock is headed even further south.

The stock’s already been hit as investors flee the unknown. And that’s not about users and ad dollars.

Regulators in the U.S. and around the world are looking at Facebook and likely to file charges against the company for its part in allowing Cambridge to continue doing what Facebook knew it was doing.

Things aren’t looking good for Zuckerberg and company because this isn’t the first time the company’s been in trouble for playing fast and loose with user information.

There’s Even More Beneath the Surface

At the time this all started, which was when a Cambridge University data analytics professor created an app called “thisisyourdigitallife” to gather research on users who granted access to their Facebook information, Facebook’s policy allowed for the collection of friends’ data by app creators and academics. Selling data to third parties or using it for advertising wasn’t prohibited.

However, in 2015, Facebook found out the researcher’s company violated its policies when it passed data onto Cambridge Analytica. In March of 2015, Facebook said it had been assured that Cambridge Analytica, Kogan (the researcher), and Christopher Wylie had deleted the data.

Facebook never told users their data was hijacked and took “limited steps to recover and secure the private information of more than 50 million individuals,” according to the London Observer newspaper.

The thisisyourdigitallife app was removed from Facebook in 2015, but Facebook didn’t suspend Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group – the firm that serviced contracts won by Cambridge Analytica until March 16, four days after the Observer contacted Facebook for comment on the breech it reported.

On top of the political blaze and likely fallout Facebook’s going to face for years to come, it’s potentially facing a more immediate problem.

If Facebook violated its 2011 consent decree with the FTC to not share personal user information, it could be subject to fines of up to $40,000 per incident. That per incident number times 50 million users, well, it’s astronomical.

David Vladeck, formerly director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, who oversaw the investigation of alleged privacy violations by Facebook and the subsequent consent decree resolving the case in 2011, recently said to the Washington Post about Facebook’s sharing of data with Cambridge Analytica “raises serious questions about compliance with the FTC consent decree.”

Jessica Rich, former deputy director for the Bureau of Consumer Protection, who oversaw the FTC’s privacy program and also led the investigation into Facebook before the 2011 consent decree, said in an e-mail to the Washington Post, “Depending on how all the facts shake out, Facebook’s actions could violate any or all of [the consent decree] provisions, to the tune of many millions of dollars in penalties. They could also constitute violations of both US and EU laws. Facebook can look forward to multiple investigations and potentially a whole lot of liability here.”

Wednesday morning, Sens. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., and John Kennedy, R-La., wrote this letter to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Richard Grassley, calling for hearings:

Dear Chairman Grassley:

We write to express serious concern regarding recent reports that data from millions of Americans was misused in order to influence voters, and to urge you to convene a hearing with the CEOs of major technology companies – including Facebook, Google, and Twitter – regarding the security of Americans’ data in light of this significant breach.

Reports indicate that private information from the Facebook profiles of more than 50 million users – representing nearly a quarter of potential U.S. voters in 2016 – was taken to conduct sophisticated psychological targeting for political ads in order to influence voters.

The reports further indicate that Facebook knew about this breach more than two years ago and failed to acknowledge it and take swift and meaningful action.

It is for these reasons that we request that you announce a hearing of the Judiciary Committee at which Senators can publicly question the CEOs of technology companies. We would be happy to discuss this matter with you further and we appreciate your consideration of this request.

Make no mistake about it, Facebook’s in deep trouble. That’s been clear from the beginning of these revelations. When the stock was at about $165, I publicly said it was going to $150, a 10% drop. Which it got to in less than a week.

Facebook bounced yesterday, but only in sympathy with the market bouncing.

The stock’s going to be under intense pressure, and it wouldn’t surprise me to see it test $120.

Bad news aside, there’s a silver lining. If you’ve been following me for a time, you know that I always say there’s a way to profit no matter how the market looks.

And, especially, no matter how a company looks…

https://wallstreetinsightsandindictments.com/2018/03/the-facebook-fiasco-and-its-future/

O Buraco do Novo Banco Continua a Crescer

A troika Passos-Maria Luís-Carlos Costa fica impávida e não diz nada, Mário Centeno deve ter uma secreta vontade de correr essa troika à bengalada e o contribuinte é que paga! Onde é que isto vai parar…?!

O Novo Banco acaba de anunciar prejuízos de 1.400 milhões de euros e, já se sabe, o Estado (quer dizer, o contribuinte…) vai ter de injetar mais uns  €792 milhões! Mário Centeno vai ter de assinar o cheque (que estará longe de ser o último…) para cobrir este buraco aberto pela decisão do inenarrável Carlos Costa.

Lembrete: Mas não tinham sido os senhores Passos Coelho, Maria da Luz Albuquerque e o citado Carlos Costa que tinham garantido que os contribuintes não iriam suportar nem 1 cêntimo em virtude da “virtuosa” estratégia que esses três tinham engendrado para a “resolução” do banco…? Se já estão esquecidos, ainda deve haver por aí uns jornais e umas ‘tapes’ com esses elegias neo-liberais em grandes planos e letras garrafais… Decoro, senhores, haja decoro, já que inteligência não tiveram!

PS: A coisa é mesmo de maldade pura. Carlos Costa, o tal que abriu o buraco do Novo Banco, odeia Centeno e fez-lhe a vida negra no Banco de Portugal… E agora Centeno tem de lhe tapar o buraco! E ainda havemos de ver os sem-vergonha do costume a acusá-lo de ser ele, Centeno, o responsável pelo buraco do carlinhos das malandrices! Pobre Mário Centeno! Pobre País que tais “dirigentes” tem!

Jornal de Negócios: “Passos, Maria Luís, Carlos Costa e Cavaco: todos garantiram que não havia custos para contribuintes com resgate do BES”

https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/banca---financas/detalhe/costa_passos_maria_luis_e_cavaco_todos_garantiram_que_nao_havia_custos_para_contribuintes

 
Cavaco Silva: "Não faz sentido" dizer que os contribuintes vão suportar os custos do BES

https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/banca---financas/detalhe/cavaco_silva_nao_faz_sentido_dizer_que_os_contribuintes_vao_suportar_os_custos_do_bes?ref=DET_relacionadas

Pois é... Gente desavergonhada mas de bem triste figura!

Playboy "Foge" do Facebook

A Playboy diz adeus ao Facebolok… E apaga as “contas”

Playboy is saying goodbye to Facebook. The iconic men’s magazine is deleting its accounts amid the platform’s data scandal.

“A guerra económica faz-se em tempo de paz”

“A guerra económica faz-se em tempo de paz”, explica o nosso amigo Giuseppe Gagliano à revista italiana Geopolítica. Com vasta obra publicada, Gagliano é presidente do Centro Studi Strategici Carlo De Cristoforis e um dos grandes especialistas italianos de guerra económica. Muito próximo das posições e matrizes de análise da École de Guerre Économique, Gagliano tem sido o grande divulgador, em língua italiana, da obra de Christian Harbulot.  Nesta entrevista, ele começa por definir a guerra económica (la guerra economica non è una guerra in senso classico; tale espressione serve a rappresentare in forma estrema i rapporti di forza non militari. Se il loro obiettivo è identico, ovvero l’accrescimento della ricchezza e della potenza di un Paese, i metodi utilizzati sono assolutamente diversi), os seus actores e os seus campos, identifica o papel central da “inteligência económica”, explica o contributo da École de Guerre Économique para “comprendere lucidamente la dinamica conflittuale del mondo odierno” e a sua relação com a geoeconomia. Uma entrevista imperdível.

La guerra economica si fa in tempo di pace

di Mirko Mussetti - 25 marzo 2018

La redazione di Geopolitica.info ha intervistato Giuseppe Gagliano, presidente del Centro Studi Strategici Carlo De Cristoforis (Cestudec), autore di numerose opere incentrate sui principi della guerra economica ed esperto di geoeconomia.

Cos’è la guerra economica?

   

Come ho avuto modo di illustrare nel corso di quasi sei anni attraverso le mie pubblicazioni, la guerra economica non è una guerra in cui il denaro, nervo di ogni conflitto, è messo al servizio dello sforzo bellico senza farvi parte direttamente. Christian Harbulot spiega che la guerra economica non è una guerra in senso classico; tale espressione serve a rappresentare in forma estrema i rapporti di forza non militari. Se il loro obiettivo è identico, ovvero l’accrescimento della ricchezza e della potenza di un Paese, i metodi utilizzati sono assolutamente diversi. Anche i risultati possono divergere, poiché la guerra conduce abbastanza spesso a un risultato inverso a quello atteso dal vincitore. La Francia del 1918 e il Regno Unito del 1945 sono testimonianze esemplari. Può sembrare paradossale, ma la guerra economica si fa in tempo di pace! Solo quando essa si rivela inefficace, i cannoni possono sparare. Un’altra definizione possibile è quella che qualifica la guerra economica come la competizione fra gli Stati nazionali per il controllo delle risorse rare, necessarie alla loro economia. Tale visione non contraddice quella di Harbulot; anzi, in un certo senso le è complementare. La prima pone l’accento sugli obiettivi a breve termine, la seconda su quelli a lungo termine. Ma sono necessarie precisazioni ulteriori.

Chi sono i principali attori in gioco?

La guerra economica è un fatto tra Stati nazionali. Le imprese giocano un ruolo importante, ma subordinato. Alcune volte rifiutano di essere coinvolte, altre volte si comportano in modo controproducente: delocalizzano, trasferiscono competenze tecnologiche all’estero, vi trasferiscono persino le proprie sedi legali. D’altra parte, la maggioranza delle imprese conta sullo Stato, affinché le aiuti a proteggersi dalla concorrenza sleale, dallo spionaggio economico e da qualsiasi manovra scorretta di competitor commerciali stranieri. Le teorie possono insegnare che lo Stato non deve immischiarsi nella vita delle imprese, ma le imprese danno prova di pragmatismo, rivolgendosi allo Stato per averne protezione. Emerge poi un secondo elemento: la nozione di guerra economica presuppone che gli Stati nazionali mantengano la propria centralità. Si tratta di un dibattito troppo lungo perché sia qui riaperto. Agli occhi di alcuni, la globalizzazione abbatte le frontiere e riduce l’importanza della sfera nazionale. Ma d’altra parte essa costringe gli Stati a intervenire fortemente, per lottare contro i suoi effetti perversi – come la crescita dell’ineguaglianza – o per difendere l’economia nazionale esposta alla competizione internazionale.

Dove si combatte?

Si può certamente affermare che le trincee e i fronti siano delineati con minore nettezza che nella guerra condotta attraverso battaglie campali. È più utile quindi paragonare la guerra economica alla guerriglia, in cui le operazioni restano discrete, gli attacchi in massa rari e le armi favorite sono quelle della manipolazione e della demoralizzazione dell’avversario. A ciascuna delle risorse rare, cui noi abbiamo accennato, corrisponde un campo di battaglia: materie prime, tecnologia, capitali, cervelli, mercati sono oggetto di una competizione accanita.

Qual è il ruolo dell’intelligence?

Strettamente legato al concetto di guerra economica troviamo quello di intelligence economica. Con essa si intende quell’insieme di attività di raccolta e trasformazione dei dati, di sorveglianza della concorrenza, di protezione delle informazioni strategiche, di capitalizzazione delle conoscenze al fine di controllare e influenzare l’ambiente economico globale. È quindi uno strumento di potere a disposizione di uno Stato. Infine, centrale per comprendere pienamente l’ampiezza e la profondità del concetto di guerra economica, è di estrema rilevanza il concetto di “guerra cognitiva” in parte analogo a quello americano di information dominance. L’espressione usata nel contesto strategico francese è quella di guerra cognitiva, definita come la capacità di utilizzare la conoscenza a scopo conflittuale. In particolare, la Scuola di Guerra Economica francese riconosce nella guerra cognitiva uno scontro tra diverse capacità di ottenere, produrre e/o ostacolare determinate conoscenze, secondo rapporti di forza contraddistinti dal binomio “forte contro debole” o, inversamente, da quello di “debole contro forte”.

Cosa contraddistingue il paradigma dell’École de Guerre Économique (EGE)?

Un concetto rilevantevall’interno della riflessione francese legata alla Scuola di guerra economica (mi permetto di rimandare al mio saggio La Geoeconomia nel pensiero strategico francese contemporaneo, Edizioni Fuoco, 2014) è certamente quello di potenza che riacquista tutta la sua centralità. Se lo consideriamo come la capacità di imporre la propria volontà agli altri o la capacità di non lasciarsi imporre la volontà degli altri, risulta arduo negarne la centralità per comprendere lucidamente la dinamica conflittuale del mondo odierno. Si pensi al ruolo che Putin attribuisce alle risorse della propria nazione come strumento di potenza offensiva. D’altronde nel mondo attuale – come d’altra parte in quello passato – esistono paesi che hanno una strategia di crescita di potenza e quelli privi di una strategia di accrescimento. Ecco perché la riflessione francese – in particolare quella di Christian Harbulot, Pichot-Duclos, Philippe Baumard, Eric Delbeque, Nicolas Moinet e Pascal Lorot – pone l’enfasi sul concetto di “patriottismo economico” che definisce l’ambito di sviluppo di una nazione dinanzi alle opportunità e alle minacce delle nuove dinamiche di potenza derivate dalla globalizzazione degli scambi.

La guerra economica si colloca nel campo della geoeconomia?

Da un punto di vista squisitamente metodologico, non c’è dubbio che la riflessione sulla guerra economica si inserisca a pieno titolo nella geoeconomia. D’altra parte lo stesso Harbulot ha più volte sottolineato la centralità delle riflessioni di Luttwak e di Esambert. In The Endagered American Dream del 1993 Luttwak afferma in termini simili a quelli di Esambert che i capitali investiti dallo Stato sono l’equivalente della potenza di fuoco, le sovvenzioni allo sviluppo di prodotti corrispondono ai progressi dell’esercito, la penetrazione dei mercati con l’aiuto statale sostituisce l’influenza diplomatica o le basi e le guarnigioni militari dispiegate all’estero.

Più esattamente, la geoeconomia rappresenta l’analisi delle strategie di ordine economico – in particolare commerciale – decise dagli stati nell’ambito delle politiche che mirano a proteggere la loro economia nazionale, ad acquisire il dominio delle tecnologie chiave o a conquistare alcuni segmenti del mercato mondiale relativi alla produzione o al commercio di un prodotto, poiché il loro possesso o il loro controllo conferisce al detentore un elemento di potere e di prestigio internazionale, concorrendo al rafforzamento del suo potenziale economico. È chiaro che, alla luce di queste riflessioni, la griglia di lettura elaborata nel corso di oltre un decennio dalla Scuola di guerra economica (alludo ai concetti di guerra economica, intelligence economica, guerra cognitiva e patriottismo economico) contribuisca a rinnovare profondamente la riflessione geoeconomica e, di riflesso, quella geopolitica.

Caos Político na União Europeia

Ponto da situação sobre o caos europeu e sua presente impotência. Análise pertinente de Elie Cohen (directeur de recherche au CNRS), no site da Telos.

    La réforme européenne attendra

Elie Cohen | Telos | March 26, 2018       

À nouveau l’horizon s’assombrit, la grande reforme de l’Union portée par Emmanuel Macron attendra. Une coalition allemande épuisée par des négociations interminables et où le souffle européen vient à manquer. Des élus italiens eurosceptiques qui ont certes renoncé à la sortie de l’euro mais alignent des propositions inflammables pour l’Union comme le revenu universel ou la monnaie fiscale. Une initiative de huit pays du Nord emmenés par les Pays-Bas fondée sur une souveraineté fiscale nationale réaffirmée, le refus de toute union de transferts, la baisse du budget européen, le rejet des propositions Macron et l’éloge de l’inter-gouvernementalisme. Il n’y aura pas dans ces conditions de plan de relance franco-allemand en mars et les ambitions pour juin sont revues à la baisse.

 Merkel em quarto mandato sob o signo da instabilidade interna...

  

Les propositions officielles

Sur la table des négociateurs, à côté des propositions Macron de création d’une autorité politique, budgétaire et financière de l’euro, figurent donc aujourd’hui les propositions de la Commission qui tournent autour de la communautarisation des politiques de relance de l’euro (ligne budgétaire UE et non budget eurozone, politiques décidées à 28 et non à 19, maintien des prérogatives du Parlement Européen…), celles de nos partenaires allemands sur la transformation de l’ESM en Fonds monétaire européen, et la restructuration des dettes souveraines des pays les plus endettés et enfin celles du veto club mené par les Néerlandais.

Quand la confusion s’installe, il n’est pas inutile de revenir à l’essentiel. Les autorités européennes (Conseil et BCE) ont été capables à la faveur de la crise d’inventer l’ESM, l’Union Bancaire et le Quantitative Easing. La Commission, quant à elle, a pratiqué une gestion politique du Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance modulant la règle du déficit en fonction des engagements pris et du contexte politique domestique. C’est à cette aune qu’il convient d’apprécier les mesures qu’à froid certains proposent de prendre.

La première mesure suggérée par les autorités allemandes consiste à mettre en place pour les pays en difficulté un dispositif obligatoire de restructuration de la dette. L’idée forgée à l’occasion des différents plans grecs est qu’il ne sert à rien de prêter à flux continus à un pays plongé dans une récession car cela ne peut qu’accroître le poids de sa dette. Les auteurs de cette proposition feignent d’ignorer qu’une telle mesure appauvrirait les détenteurs domestiques de dettes souveraines, ruinerait les banques et fonds de pension domestiques et feraient fuir les investisseurs étrangers. Exactement le mécanisme auquel on a assisté après le fameux communiqué de Deauville. Dans les deux cas la motivation est louable : rendre soutenable la dette et éviter au contribuable de payer. Dans les deux cas l’effet sur les marchés n’est pas anticipé. Avec un facteur aggravant, l’Italie pèse davantage que la Grèce. Une crise partie d’Italie serait autrement plus difficile à gérer.

Comme si cela ne suffisait pas, côté allemand on propose également de transformer l’ESM, avec ses 500 milliards d’euros de force de frappe, en Fonds monétaire européen. 

L’idée est de sortir du débat politique le sauvetage des pays en difficulté pour le techniciser et éviter ainsi les interminables Ecofin, les réunions du Conseil et autres sommets de la dernière chance. Si ce FME était communautarisé, si donc les différents États étaient privés de leur pouvoir de veto, si en particulier le Bundestag n’avait plus son mot à dire, on pourrait saluer l’avancée communautaire. Mais tel n’est pas le sens de la proposition Schaüble qui voit dans cette mesure un renforcement des disciplines, une automaticité des dispositifs de conditionnalité tout en laissant au Bundestag le soin de décider si oui ou non l’Allemagne apporte son concours.

Pour parfaire l’édifice, côté allemand on se veut coopératif pour l’achèvement de l’Union bancaire, on entend renforcer les moyens du fonds de résolution en acceptant que l’ESM puisse participer à une recapitalisation d’une banque en restructuration mais seulement après que les banques aient purgé leurs mauvais risques et réduit leur exposition aux dettes souveraines nationales. Les fonds de garantie nationaux quant à eux ne pourraient être abondés par des fonds communautaires, tout au plus pourraient-ils bénéficier de prêts. En somme la mutualisation du risque n’est envisageable qu’après une très sensible réduction du risque. Un groupe d’économistes franco-allemands va même plus loin puisqu’ils proposent une « concentration charge » imposée aux banques qui feraient la part trop belle à la détention de dettes souveraines de leurs pays[1].

L’Union bancaire, à laquelle ont souscrit les autorités allemandes en 2012, est ainsi l’objet d’une renégociation permanente pour éliminer l’aléa moral et interdire la formation d’une union de transferts.

Les propositions des économistes italiens

Si le premier objectif de toute réforme est de ne pas nuire, de ne pas aggraver la situation qu’on prétend traiter, alors autant éviter ces réformes et se concentrer sur ce qui peut être plus directement utile. C’est du reste la thèse d’économistes italiens en réponse aux propositions des économistes franco-allemands[2]. Pour eux, l’enjeu est le risque de redénomination : c’est le sort de l’euro qui serait en cause en cas de crise italienne. Multiplier les marques de défiance à l’égard de la dette italienne et de la solidité des banques italiennes pour calmer la peur allemande de l’aléa moral, c’est se tromper de cible et donc de remède.

Parmi les mesures envisagées, il en est d’autres qui, en théorie, peuvent faire la différence de manière plus vertueuse.

La première consiste à instaurer un budget Eurozone de 1 point de PIB pour inciter les pays en transition à faire les réformes structurelles nécessaires, corriger les chocs asymétriques en prévoyant par exemple un financement d’une partie de l’indemnisation du chômage, et mener une politique contracyclique en cas de choc symétrique.

Une seconde mesure consiste à nommer un ministre en charge de l’Eurozone, qui présiderait l’Ecofin et qui serait vice-président de la Commission pour prendre en charge la politique du cœur de l’union. Sa légitimité démocratique serait renforcée par une responsabilité devant le Parlement européen réuni en formation Euro.

Une troisième enfin porterait sur les enjeux réels de la nouvelle donne géopolitique et géoéconomique en prévoyant des réponses communes à l’Eurozone tant en matière de coopération militaire (nouvelle génération d’armements, mutualisation des moyens, coopération sur les terrains opérationnels en Afrique d’abord), industrielle (numérique, innovation de rupture…), climatique (effort coordonné d’investissements en matière de transition énergétique) que commerciale (résister à Trump et apporter une réponse à la montée de courants hostiles au libre échange).

Ces propositions ont un triple intérêt : relancer l’Eurozone, donner des moyens pour les nouvelles politiques, inscrire dans les faits la géométrie variable. Cela les rend inacceptables aux eurosceptiques avoués, aux défenseurs de l’illusion d’une Europe des 28 marchant d’un même pas et aux allergiques à toute forme de transfert.

Quel compromis?

Si le programme minimal est dangereux et si le programme souhaitable est hors de portée, faut-il accepter de différer les ambitions à plus tard ou travailler à un compromis ? Et, si oui, lequel ?

Les économistes franco-allemands cités plus haut considèrent qu’il faut trouver un compromis entre responsabilité (réduction du risque) et solidarité (partage du risque).

Qui ne souscrirait à un accord qui rassurerait les Allemands sur la prévention de l’aléa moral et les pays du Sud sur la fin des politiques austéritaires qui cassent la politique du crédit et zomibifient les banques ? Le problème est que l’échange est inégal car les risques des dispositions sur la restructuration des dettes, les charges de concentration, le nouveau FME, et le refus d’un budget conséquent de l’Eurozone reprennent l’intégralité des demandes allemandes. Face à cela la capacité budgétaire limitée consacrée notamment à la lutte contre un chômage de masse et les progrès en matière d’union bancaire ne font pas le poids.

Les économistes franco-allemands avancent un dernier argument qu’ils espèrent décisif : il faut renoncer au Pacte de Stabilité et de croissance qui n’a jamais fonctionné pour lui substituer une règle simple d’équilibre à moyen terme du solde budgétaire.

Tout dépassement pour les pays dont la dette publique excède 60% du PIB doit se faire en dette junior donc à un plus fort coût. Cette proposition est habile à de multiples titres : elle prend acte du mauvais fonctionnement d’une règle qui a connu de multiples dérogations, elle met l’accent sur l’appropriation nationale de la règle, elle laisse subsister un flou sur la définition précise de l’objectif lui-même. Mais elle ne règle en rien les objections déjà soulevées en cas de crise italienne.

Au-delà des questions techniques

Pour un dernier groupe d’intervenants dans le débat public ces considérations techniques sur la conditionnalité de l’aide, le fonctionnement du fonds de garantie ou l’appropriation nationale de l’obligation d’équilibre budgétaire passent à côté du double défi qu’affronte réellement la communauté à savoir la question migratoire et la question démocratique. Ce sont ces questions qui nourrissent la dynamique populiste s’étendant sur tout le territoire de l’Union[3].

S’il est vrai que le choc migratoire et l’absence de solidarité européenne expliquent sans doute largement le succès des populistes en Italie, il est moins évident que l’absence d’instruction par le Parlement européen des plans d’aide passés à la Grèce ou au Portugal aient eu des effets majeurs. Un Parlement Eurozone n’aurait pu empêcher les plans d’ajustement structurel négociés avec la Troika. Faut-il rappeler ici les rejets démocratiquement exprimés par le peuple grec, sans effets sur la dureté des plans mis en œuvre?

Comme vient de le rappeler dans une conférence récente Benoît Coeuré, il y a trois lignes de défense et de relance de l’Euro et il ne faut ni les confondre ni en négliger l’une ou l’autre.

La première est celle des marchés. Elle passe par le rétablissement des conditions de fonctionnement du système financier européen, ce qui suppose qu’on revienne sur la «nationalisation» des systèmes de crédit, que les banques diversifient leurs actifs et que des regroupements européens aient lieu; cela passe aussi par une union des marchés de capitaux.

La deuxième ligne est celle de la régulation et de la fourniture de liquidités en situation de tension notamment: c’est le rôle qu’a joué la BCE. Mais la BCE n’a pas vocation à faire la politique macroéconomique de l’Europe en gérant la demande globale. L’outil budgétaire et fiscal doit prendre le relais. Benoît Coeuré rappelle ce faisant la ligne Draghi selon laquelle la discipline budgétaire et les réformes structurelles sont indispensables comme l’action contracyclique!

À ce stade il n’y a donc pas de fenêtre d’opportunité pour faire passer un plan ambitieux de réforme et même un plan franco-allemand plus limité mais réellement utile. Il faut donc disposer d’un compas pour apprécier les tentatives de compromis qui ne manqueront pas d’apparaître.

Le premier critère à considérer est l’utilité des mesures envisagées. On l’a vu, certains projets peuvent aggraver la situation sans bénéfice immédiat. Il vaut mieux donc y renoncer. Surtout si, comme on l’entend ici ou là, dans le troc franco-allemand UB + FME + Petit budget Européen + Réforme de l’IS il y a l’arrivée à la tête de la BCE en 2019 du « faucon » allemand Jens Weidman.

Le deuxième critère doit être celui qui permet de préserver l’avenir. On rangera dans cette catégorie les mesures qui incitent à des comportements vertueux ou à l’appropriation par les pays concernés de mesures qui leur sont utiles.

Le troisième critère doit permettre de distinguer entre les mesures d’intérêt général et celles qui confortent telle institution plutôt que telle autre. À cet égard donner aux 28 un droit de regard, voire de veto sur l’évolution de la zone euro alors que certains pays ont clairement fait savoir qu’ils n’entendaient pas y participer n’est pas justifié. Autant là aussi renoncer à des réformes qui empêchent la mise en œuvre de la géométrie variable.

Enfin, l’Europe a besoin de manifestations de cohésion et de solidarité en matière commerciale face à Trump, sur les réfugiés avec la renégociation de la Convention de Dublin, sur le numérique avec des coalitions de volontaires, sur la Défense avec une mise en commun plus poussée des moyens. À défaut d’accords larges, pourquoi ne pas envisager des coalition of the willing?

[1] A. Benassy-Quéré et alii, «Reconciling Risk sharing with market discipline: a constructive approach to Eurozone Reform» CEPR, n° 91.

[2] M. Messori and S. Micossi, «Counterproductive proposals on Euro Area Reform by French and German Economists», CEPS n° 2018/04.

[3] Benoit Coeuré, «The euro area’s three lines of defence», speech at the conference «Deepening of EU», Ljubljana 2 February 2018.

Eleitores americanos querem "mais força" contra a China

Os eleitores americanos consideram que Washington tem facilitado demasiado a expansão chinesa e, apesar das medidas já tomadas por Donald Trump, querem mais. 73% vêem a China como uma ameaça económica.

Wall Street e alguns interesses instalados poderão temer e opor-se às medidas tomadas por Trump mas, claramente, o eleitorado tem outra posição. E, se Wall Street e o eleitorado divergem de modo radical, resta saber qual destas duas posições mais vai contribuir para a definição do "bem comum"... 

Uma coisa é certa: a posição adoptada por Trump tem largo apoio no eleitorado e são contestadas pela "aristocracia financista". Uma divergência estratégica no interior do "modelo americano" que ameaça transformar-se numa ruptura. Os próximos tempos, nos Estados Unidos (e, portanto, em todo o mundo) não vão ser fáceis para as narrativas políticas neo-liberais e para a "globalização feliz"...

Resultados de uma sondagem de "Rasmussen Reports" publicada hoje:

Voters Say U.S. Not Tough Enough on China

Even as President Trump imposes tariffs on billions of dollars in Chinese goods to balance the trade playing field, voters here continue to view China as an economic threat and think the U.S. government has been too easy on it.


The latest Rasmussen Reports national telephone and online survey finds that 73% of Likely U.S. Voters consider China a bigger threat to the United States economically than militarily. Only 13% say China’s a bigger military threat, and just as many (14%) are undecided. This is consistent with findings for the last several years. (To see survey question wording, click here.)

As Raízes dos Totalitarismos Comunistas: Da ditadura jacobina ao gnosticismo marxista

Do nosso amigo Giuseppe Gagliano, acaba de sair a versão francesa de um dos seus últimos ensaios. Parabéns, Giuseppe!

Fakebook… diz a NBC News

A NBC News não tem grande opinião do Facebook, não o esconde e baptizou-o de… Fakebook!

O Business Insider tem a notícia: 

NBC News doesn't think very highly of Facebook, and it isn't holding back.

At an event on Wednesday, the news division's group chairman, Andy Lack, and its senior vice president of digital, Nick Ascheim, were critical of Facebook's relationship with the media industry, questioning whether the social network has any real interest in the news business or in dealing with the myriad problems it faces related to fake news and misinformation on its platform.

The two executives expressed a growing frustration about working with Facebook over the years and cast doubt on the prospect that the tech giant would ever help media companies make money. Lack said NBC executives had even taken to calling Facebook "Fakebook."

To read more about how NBC News execs unloaded on Facebook – while praising Snap – click here.

“We Need to Talk About Europe”, dizem os nossos amigos da Geopolitical Futures

Mal Angela Merkel conseguiu formar um governo, depois de longos meses de impasse na sequência da sua eleitoral vitória de Pirro, e logo uns dois em cada três eleitores italianos manifestam o seu repúdio por esta Europa "tedesca"...

Para a GPF, "Now that Germany has finally formed a new government, the de facto leader of the EU can get back to being the de facto leader of the EU. But Italy has just elected into power parties that are less-than-friendly to Germany’s agenda. Jacob Shapiro and Cole Altom discuss how this peculiar era of nationalism is just one chapter in a much longer story about Europe": https://geopoliticalfutures.com/need-talk-europe/