Berlim Revela a Sua Primeira "Estratégia de Segurança Nacional" Pós-II Guerra

A Alemanha revelou há dias o seu primeiro documento (pós II Guerra) de Estratégia de Segurança Nacional, aqui apresentado e subtilmente comentado por Ben Schreer, Executive Director Europe, do International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Germany's first National Security Strategy

"On 14 June, the German government released the country’s first-ever National Security Strategy (NSS).

"The NSS is fundamentally a compromise between a three-party coalition government. Consequently, some long-overdue reforms that would have enabled more coherent German national-security strategy-making fell victim to political bargaining during the 15-month drafting process led by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Alliance 90/The Greens). Most prominently, a national-security council mirroring that of other countries and meant to coordinate better and faster responses to complex security challenges did not survive disagreements between the chancellor and foreign minister over where to house such a body and who would control it. This outcome risks frustrating the NSS’s key stated purpose of ‘integrated security’. In addition, Finance Minister Christian Lindner (Free Democratic Party) insisted on making the NSS a cost-neutral exercise, which is likely to lead to disputes between ministries going forward.

Political compromise tends to produce vague and intentionally imprecise language, and this is a characteristic of the NSS. It states that in broad terms the world’s external-security environment is ‘marked by rising systemic rivalry’ and, more specifically, that ‘today’s Russia is for now the most significant threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area’. The modifiers ‘today’ and ‘for now’, however, imply that Berlin perceives Russia as only a temporary threat. This idea sits uneasily with most Eastern and Northern European allies, whose strategic trust Germany seeks to regain and who see Russia as a long-term threat.

On China, the NSS reflects a compromise between Scholz’s conciliatory stance and Baerbock’s more hawkish approach. It names China as a ‘partner, competitor and systemic rival’ and notes that competition has ‘increased in the past years’. It further identifies China’s more assertive behaviour regionally and internationally, but also clings to the notion that ‘China remains a partner without whom many global challenges and crises cannot be resolved’. The reason for such optimism is unclear, since Beijing has weaponised climate-change issues and remains unwilling to sever its strategic ties with Russia.

Moreover, the NSS fails to mention Germany’s key interest in Taiwan Strait stability, a wasted opportunity to demonstrate to the US and Indo-Pacific partners (and China) that Berlin is seriously concerned about the possibility of a conflict that would have devastating consequences for Germany and Europe. There is also no reference to growing Sino-Russian ties, which are fast becoming a security concern for many European and Indo-Pacific countries alike. ..... "

https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/06/germanys-first-ever-national-security-strategy/