Voltar ao Mar É Preciso!

A entrevista do ministro António Costa e Silva ao 'Diário de Notícias', do passado dia 8, é (talvez) o mais importante documento, das últimas décadas, sobre a geoeconomia portuguesa. 

Uma leitura imprescindível para quem tente perceber o que pode ser a posição de Portugal e as funções que pode ter no modelo global emergente. 

Além de que, para variar, observar um político que pensa é sempre uma oportunidade a não perder. Por isso, registo.

https://www.dn.pt/politica/costa-silva-ate-2030-se-tivermos-novo-cais-sines-passa-de-22-para-8-milhoes-de-contentores-14924032.html

Tecnologia Militar da China: O "Estado da Arte"

WATCH: China's New J-16 Electronic Warfare Fighter Shocked The World 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M-r_YkWZ5x4

Vladislav Surkov volta a explicar o "Modelo Putin"

«Notre nouvel État aura une glorieuse histoire»

“Le modèle contemporain de l'État russe commence par la confiance et tient par la confiance. C'est ce qui le différencie du modèle occidental, qui cultive la méfiance et la critique. C'est de là qu'il tire sa force. Notre nouvel État, en ce nouveau siècle, aura une longue et glorieuse histoire. Il ne sera pas brisé. Il agira à sa manière, obtiendra et conservera les meilleures places dans la ligue des champions de la lutte géopolitique. Tôt ou tard, tous ceux qui demandent à la Russie de "changer de comportement" devront se résigner à l'accepter telle qu'elle est. Après tout, qu'ils aient le choix n'est qu'une illusion.”

Tradução do original em russo do texto de Surkov "La Longue Gouvernance de Poutine", pelo “Le Point” e pela fundação Fondapol

https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/vladislav-sourkov-notre-nouvel-etat-aura-une-glorieuse-histoire-10-03-2022-2467612_24.php

John Robb: A Guerra Pelo Futuro

A mais recente comunicação do nosso amigo John Robb sobre a "guerra civil" em curso no Ocidente e travada online: Cultura, tecnologia e definição do nosso futuro, temas que Robb tem trabalhado, nos últimos 20 anos, e de que, nesta comunicação, apresenta o "estado da arte". 

Thanks, John.

The War for the Future

There's a war for the future underway. It's being fought online. Here's some insight into how it is being fought, and what is at stake.

John Robb | May 31

World War 3 is a guerrilla information war with no division between military and civilian participation.

Marshall McLuhan, 1968



The western world is now engaged in a guerrilla information war, and it’s a guerrilla war where everyone is a participant, whether they know it or not. 

We can see evidence of this war all around us.

· We saw it in the sudden, unexpected, and potentially catastrophic mobilization for a global war with Russia after it invaded Ukraine.

· We see it in the efforts to control online speech, the war on misinformation, and the disconnection of politicians.

· We see it in the increasing distrust of institutions and experts.

This is an online war to decide who controls the western technosphere — an environment of interconnected technological artifacts that most of the world is now living within.

What does control of the network technosphere provide the winner? It provides the winner with the ability to:

· to set and strictly enforce standards of speech and behavior of billions, both online and offline (increasingly).

· to direct or redirect public debate and political discourse (either to solve problems or control outcomes).

· implement sweeping social change on a global scale using online incentives, control over information flows, and draconian punishments (the ability to disconnect dissenters).

Let’s explore this a bit.

The Network Technosphere

We don’t live in a physical environment anymore.

· We now live inside a networked technosphere. A world operated and controlled by interconnected technologies. While the environment provides us with new capabilities, it has complexified the challenges (from terrorism to financial collapse to COVID) we face, making them difficult to solve using traditional methods.

· The technosphere envelops and immerses us from the moment we wake up until we go to sleep. In most cases, our ability to utilize it effectively determines our success or failure, both economically and socially. In short, we’ve become so dependent on it.

· Our immersion has altered us. It’s rewiring our brains in ways we don’t fully comprehend, from processing information to relating to others, and that rewiring is driving changes in the way we organize our society.

Swarm vs. Horde

The antagonists in this war consist of people who have responded to this rewiring differently. One network seeks cohesion, consensus, and collective action, and the other wants to leverage the network to maximize individual and local autonomy. 

Here’s some detail:

· The cohesive network swarm seeks to impose a strict secular orthodoxy over the west. It engages in moral warfare to coercively align people, corporations, and governments with influence over the technosphere into alignment.

· The disorganized network horde seeks to prevent the swarm from imposing its orthodoxy through disruptive dissent. It uses the leverage provided by the network to mount disruptive attacks that actively erode support for the swarm’s alignment.

· This war will rage on until one side wins or we develop a method of networked decision-making that incorporates the strengths of each approach into an integrated whole.

Let’s dig into the details of each.

Coercive Alignment (The Swarm)

The network swarm wants to tame the technosphere by using it to aggressively eliminate everything they see as a threat (racism, sexism, colonialism, fascism, etc.). When it sees a threat, it rapidly mobilizes (using empathy triggers) to amplify the danger posed by the threat and gain (or coerce) support for network controls to prevent it from reoccurring in the future.

Online, the swarm fights through moral warfare. It does this by using the network to amplify the menace of new threats — which creates widespread fear and anxiety — to force people to act cohesively and forcibly (usually by imposing limits and restrictions) to oppose it¹. The more threatening the danger, the larger and faster the response. The moral axis of the swarm has three parts:

· Equalization. “We can only be free when we are equal in every way.” The elimination of all power differentials between individuals, from wealth to weapons ownership to social status. Example: “Gun owners put us all at risk.” Equity: equality of outcome. Restorative justice: compensation for groups that have suffered historical inequality through forced restitution (by those in privileged groups) and enhanced opportunities.

· Transhumanism. The need to transcend the human condition’s limitations, tyranny, and weaknesses. Transsexualism (LGBTQ….) is merely the tip of the iceberg. Transhumanism also radically transforms human relationships (friendship, family, sex, etc.). Transhumanism isn’t just an option; it’s a moral imperative. NOTE: Transhumanism will accelerate with the advent of augmented reality (AR).² AR allows people to change how they are perceived.

· Safeness. “An injury to one person is an injury to all of us.” No damage or injury is morally permissible if due to human action or inaction and must be prevented, regardless of the costs or limitations on freedoms involved. Injuries range from death to a loss of self-esteem/image. Injuries caused due to power differentials (privilege) or opposition to transhumanism are seen as existential threats and/or unmitigated evil.

Disruptive Dissent (The Horde)

The horde’s goal is to slow, alter, or prevent the establishment of a restrictive online orthodoxy. It spontaneously forms in response to encroachment. Disruptive dissent is usually only cohesive when it mobilizes to protect a superempowered individual who has the ability to hold the Swarm at bay (Trump, Musk, etc.).

Online, the horde fights in the psychological realm through maneuver and fast transients (quickly changing topics)³. It does this to disrupt, disorient, and overload the swarm’s thinking ability. Unlike the swarm, the horde is motivated by underlying factors that energize human behavior. These include:

· Autonomy. Freedom of mind and body. To be allowed to think, speak and act differently, particularly in opposition to the prevailing wisdom—the ability to take significant or dangerous risks and occasionally be wrong. Autonomy is only restricted when those actions would cause tangible and considerable harm to others (a high bar).

· Localism. A desire for control over the local environment (the physical offline reality). The ability of individuals, families, and communities to think, behave, and operate differently than what the present consensus mandates — which often manifests as a focus on family (formation), religion (local moral standards), and community (the rules). Opting out of global standards is prized both individually and collectively.

· Dissimilarity. Reverence for differences in human beings due to innate characteristics (intelligence, strength, gender, upbringing, etc.), those achieved through status-seeking behaviors (wealth, bodybuilding, knowledge, experience, etc.), and choices (owning guns, religious beliefs, etc.). In short, they believe that seeking differences is a good thing.

We’ll get into how this war will play out in a future report.

Sincerely,

John Robb

Japão: Nova Lei de Proteção da Economia

Na complexa, delicada e muito perigosa conjuntura estratégica que o mundo atravessa, o Parlamento japonês toma medidas para a proteção e segurança da economia do arquipélago.

Japan Turns Its Attention to Economic Security

Sheila A. Smith

Last week, the Japanese Diet passed a law to protect the economy from hostile actors. This, along with a revision of national strategy and a long-term defense plan, will enhance Japan’s ability to navigate growing geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific.  Read more on Asia Unbound

Requisitório Contra a Diluição do Estado-Nação

Antigo piloto de caça e autor do único tratado de estratégia aérea em línguas latinas, o Coronel (R) Régis Chamagne é também conferencista (nas áreas de defesa, instituições europeias e geopolítica) e porta-voz da "Associação para uma França Livre". É nesta última condição que assina este requisitório contra a diluição do Estado-Nação.

Clicar na imagem para a expandir

A Guerra da Ucrânia e o Fim da Rússia

Peter Zeiham, uma velha cumplicidade aqui no IntelNomics, escrevia, em 29 de Dezembro do ano passado, um profético “A Ukraine War and the End of Russia”, que rematava assim:

“A Russian-Ukrainian war would keep the bulk of the Russian army bottled up in an occupation that would be equal parts desperate and narcissistic and protracted until such time that Russia’s terminal demography transforms that army into a powerless husk. And all that would transpire on a patch of territory in which the United States has minimal strategic interests.

“That’s rough for the Ukrainians, but from the American point of view, it is difficult to imagine a better, more thorough, and above all safer way for Russia to commit suicide.”

Antes de partir para as comemorações de um Ano Novo que, já o prevíamos, de feliz ia ter muito pouco ou mesmo nada, a redacção do IntelNomics leu e discutiu este trabalho do Peter Zeihan. E Putin não o leu...? 

O Que É o Putinismo...? Resposta na ‘Conflits’

“O Putinismo não é uma ideologia (conservadora, nacionalista, eurasista), nem um projeto político (vingança da história, neo-imperialismo, neo-sovietismo). O Putinismo apresenta-se antes de tudo como uma estratégia política que visa mostrar sua força, e às vezes usá-la, para fortalecer um poder kremlinocêntrico e kremlinocentrípeto com um objetivo principal, que nunca varia: defender o Estado russo contra as forças hostis que o ameaçam, de dentro e de fora. O Putinismo é filho da perestroika e do colapso da URSS e bisneto da Revolução Russa e do colapso do Império Russo.”

Qu’est-ce que le poutinisme?

 

par Jean-Robert Raviot | Conflits | 10 Mai 2022

 

Dès le lendemain du déclenchement de l’offensive russe contre l’Ukraine le 24 février 2022, la question est posée du soutien de la société russe, et plus particulièrement des élites – y compris au sommet – à une guerre d’une ampleur sans précédent sur le sol européen depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qui plus est, susceptible d’être perçue en Russie comme fratricide. D’emblée, cette offensive se présente comme une épreuve pour le poutinisme. Des études sociologiques indiquent que son rôle de chef de guerre aurait permis à Vladimir Poutine d’étendre, et même de renforcer le socle de sa légitimité politique[1]. Néanmoins, le prolongement des opérations, voire son évolution en guérilla, pourrait changer le regard des Russes, et des élites russes, sur la stratégie choisie par le président russe.

Officiellement, la Russie mène une opération de libération de l’Ukraine, placée sous le joug de dirigeants qualifiés de « clique d’usurpateurs ». Cette opération est ponctuée de mesures présentées comme ponctuelles d’élimination ciblée des forces nationalistes ukrainiennes les plus radicales, qualifiées de « nazies ». Jusqu’ici, la propagande officielle russe qui accompagne les opérations semble porter ses fruits, en ce sens que la dimension offensive de cette guerre reste masquée aux yeux des Russes. L’usage de la force puise aux sources du poutinisme. Il n’est donc pas illogique qu’il agisse, dans un premier temps, comme un bain de jouvence. Car le poutinisme n’est ni une idéologie (conservatrice, nationaliste, eurasiste), ni un projet politique (revanche sur l’histoire, néo-impérialisme, néosoviétisme). Le poutinisme se présente d’abord comme une stratégie politique visant à montrer sa force, et parfois à en faire usage, afin de renforcer un pouvoir kremlinocentrique[2] et kremlinocentripète avec un objectif principal, qui ne varie jamais : défendre l’État russe contre les forces hostiles qui le menacent, de l’intérieur comme de l’extérieur. Le poutinisme est à la fois l’enfant de la perestroïka et de la chute de l’URSS et l’arrière-petit-enfant de la révolution russe et de la chute de l’Empire russe.

 

Le césarisme poutinien

L’image a fait le tour du monde. La scène se passe à Moscou, le 21 août 1991. Boris Eltsine, élu deux mois plus tôt président de la Russie au suffrage universel, radieux, est juché sur un char, avec en arrière-plan le drapeau tricolore russe. Il annonce triomphalement l’échec du putsch contre Gorbatchev. En imposant son autorité aux ministères régaliens de l’URSS, le premier président russe précipite l’éviction de Gorbatchev et la chute de l’URSS, qui intervient quatre mois plus tard. Deux ans après, en octobre 1993, Eltsine dissout le Parlement. Il ordonne aux forces de sécurité intérieure de prendre l’assaut du bâtiment, au sein duquel certains opposants armés se sont retranchés. L’offensive fait 150 morts. Eltsine déclare l’état d’urgence, suspend les institutions et convoque un référendum pour faire adopter, quelques semaines plus tard, la première Constitution libérale et démocrate de l’histoire de la Russie. Libéralisme et démocratie, dans la nouvelle Russie, sont donc marqués du sceau indélébile du césarisme.

 

À lire également: Pourquoi Vladimir Poutine voit des «nazis» en Ukraine

 

Héritier désigné par Boris Eltsine avant d’être consacré par le suffrage universel, Vladimir Poutine se saisit du flambeau césariste des origines. L’assaut se porte alors contre les foyers terroristes du Nord-Caucase. Cette deuxième guerre intérieure en Tchétchénie (après celle de 1994-1996) fonde le poutinisme. Elle pose l’image médiatique du nouveau président, alors totalement inconnu des Russes, en chef de guerre auquel on attribue l’intention de rétablir l’ordre, l’autorité de l’État, la puissance de la Russie. Appuyé, contrairement à son prédécesseur, par une forte majorité parlementaire, Vladimir Poutine consolide son autorité. Si la Constitution russe demeure d’essence libérale, la pratique du pouvoir prend une tournure autoritaire de plus en plus affirmée. Le césarisme de Vladimir Poutine associe une forme démocratique de légitimité à une réalité monarchique du pouvoir. Le jeu démocratique est limité par l’ultra-majorité détenue par le parti du pouvoir, Russie unie, au Parlement et dans presque toutes les régions depuis 2004. Les forces d’opposition doivent accepter de ne limiter leurs critiques qu’à la politique économique et sociale, faute de quoi elles se voient écarter du jeu électoral et de l’espace public. Aujourd’hui, l’opposition hors système n’a plus de visibilité en Russie.

 

L’élite du pouvoir et l’oligarchie d’État

Le poutinisme ne se limite pas à un mode autoritaire d’exercice du pouvoir, à un discours politique conservateur ou à l’expression d’une volonté de restaurer la puissance de la Russie sur la scène internationale. C’est aussi un système de pouvoir qui s’appuie sur une élite du pouvoir loyale, un noyau dur restreint autour d’une garde prétorienne[3] constituée d’hommes qui, pour nombre d’entre eux, sont issus de la mairie de Saint-Pétersbourg où Vladimir Poutine a accompli le début de sa carrière politique dans les années 1990-1996. On retrouve ce noyau dur aujourd’hui au sommet de l’État russe, aux postes-clefs régaliens (sécurité, intérieur, défense, justice et parquet général) comme aux postes clés de la korpokratura, ces nouveaux grands patrons issus de l’appareil d’État, placés par le président à la tête des grands groupes et des conglomérats d’État (ou contrôlés par l’État) afin de mieux piloter les secteurs stratégiques de l’économie (énergie, technologies de pointe, armement, infrastructures et chaînes logistiques…). La naissance de cette nouvelle oligarchie d’État, vers la fin de la décennie 2000, témoigne de ce que Vladimir Poutine a réussi à inverser le rapport de force entre l’État russe et les oligarques qui s’était instauré, dans les années 1990, dans le contexte de la faiblesse et du fort endettement extérieur de la Russie, très en faveur de ces derniers.

 

Le retour de la puissance russe

Dans les années 2000, le «rétablissement de la verticale du pouvoir» par Poutine, en interne, coïncide avec une flambée du prix des hydrocarbures sur le marché mondial, qui permet à la Russie d’opérer un réel décollage économique et d’envisager, au-delà de son désendettement, une stratégie de modernisation et de développement économique. Le mieux-être économique permet une amélioration très nette du niveau de vie moyen de la population, auprès de laquelle l’ascension politique de Poutine coïncide avec pouvoir d’achat et accession à la consommation. Pour de nombreux Russes, le poutinisme est synonyme d’un quotidien qui s’améliore et d’un style de vie qui se rapproche des standards occidentaux. Collectivement, ce boom économique offre à la Russie et aux Russes une revanche sur les humiliations subies au cours des années 1990, avec la chute de l’URSS, suivie de la paupérisation massive liée aux réformes économiques et à la privatisation.

 

À lire également: Poutine par lui-même. La conquête, du pouvoir

 

Le discours prononcé par Vladimir Poutine en février 2007 à Munich marque un tournant de la politique extérieure russe. Le président russe affirme une volonté de puissance et emploie un vocabulaire offensif inédit, qui ne fera que se renforcer par la suite. Il s’agit de s’opposer au monde unipolaire (dominé par Washington) de l’après-guerre froide et de faire de la Russie un des pôles majeurs du monde multipolaire en gestation. Moscou avait déjà contesté la prétention américaine à consolider sa domination unipolaire, en 1999 – opposition aux frappes de l’OTAN contre la Serbie – et en 2003 – veto contre la guerre américano-britannique en Irak. Après Munich, la Russie monte le ton. Lors du sommet de l’OTAN à Bucarest (2008), Moscou s’insurge contre une éventuelle adhésion de la Géorgie et/ou de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, perçues comme autant de menaces pour la sécurité nationale. Joignant le geste à la parole, la Russie intervient militairement en Géorgie pour soutenir la république sécessionniste d’Ossétie du Sud contre Tbilissi. En 2014, l’éviction du président ukrainien Ianoukovitch est analysée, à Moscou, comme un coup d’État issu non pas d’une révolte populaire, mais d’un travail en profondeur d’ONG instrumentalisées de longue date par les États occidentaux afin de faire basculer l’Ukraine dans leur camp. Après ce changement de pouvoir, jugé illégitime, à Kiev, Moscou annexe la Crimée, après un référendum sans équivoque en faveur du rattachement de la péninsule à la Fédération de Russie, puis soutient, pendant huit ans, la rébellion armée des républiques sécessionnistes de Donetsk et de Lougansk, dans l’est de l’Ukraine, prélude à l’enclenchement de la grande offensive lancée en février contre l’Ukraine.

 

Le consensus poutinien a-t-il un avenir?

Le consensus de la société russe autour du poutinisme s’est construit sur un rapport d’allégeance, plutôt que d’adhésion au pouvoir. Si l’entrée en guerre contre l’Ukraine semble, au début de celle-ci, susciter la consolidation de ce consensus, de nombreux éléments conduisent à s’interroger sur la pérennité à plus long terme de ce consensus poutinien. Rappelons que la phase ascensionnelle du poutinisme a correspondu à une période de fort développement économique : entre 2000 et 2020, le PIB de la Russie a triplé et le PIB/habitant, qui représentait en 2000 à peine un tiers de celui de la France, s’élève aujourd’hui à plus de la moitié de celui de la France[4]. Ce mieux-être économique s’est accompagné d’une forte hausse du prestige international de la Russie, en particulier aux yeux des Russes eux-mêmes. Or, les indicateurs socio-économiques sont aujourd’hui bien plus mauvais. S’il est encore tôt pour mesurer l’impact des sanctions occidentales sur la population russe, il semble indiscutable qu’il provoquera a minima une stagnation du niveau de vie et une baisse de la consommation. Cette crise prévisible sera perçue comme une dégradation supplémentaire dans le contexte d’une baisse du niveau de vie constante, pour la majorité des Russes, depuis le milieu des années 2010. En outre, comment une mise au ban durable de la Russie sera-t-elle perçue? Le « tournant vers l’Est », c’est-à-dire vers la Chine, de la politique étrangère russe, une évolution qui devrait s’accélérer du fait de la guerre en Ukraine, réussira-t-elle à produire des dividendes économiques palpables pour la population ? Pourra-t-on, dans une société de consommation telle que la société russe, se passer des marques occidentales et se contenter des marques chinoises ? Quid d’une Russie, même prospère, totalement réorientée vers l’Asie ? Quelles sont les limites d’un autoritarisme politique qui, à la faveur de cette « opération spéciale », s’est renforcé au point de bannir toute voix dissidente de l’espace public ? Quid d’un groupe élitaire consolidé autour du chef du Kremlin, mais vieillissant, et qui doit désormais impérativement organiser sa successio?

 

À lire également: Poutine, le gaz et l’Europe

 

[1] Voir l’étude du Centre Levada, 30 mars 2022:  

https://www.levada.ru/2022/03/30/odobrenie-institutov-rejtingi-partij-i-politikov/

[2] Jean-Robert Raviot, Qui dirige la Russie?, Lignes de Repères, 2007.

[3] Jean-Robert Raviot, «Le prétorianisme russe: l’exercice du pouvoir selon Vladimir Poutine», Hérodote, no 166/167, 2017.

[4] Chiffres de la Banque mondiale, en PPP. Voir https://data.worldbank.org

Mots-clefs: Poutine, Poutinisme, Russie

À propos de l’auteur: Jean-Robert Raviot

Docteur en sciences politiques. Professeur de civilisation russe contemporaine à l'université Paris-Nanterre.

 

https://www.revueconflits.com/quest-ce-que-le-poutinisme/

Espírito de Combate: Como o Desenvolver e Praticar...

Dois homens da École de Guerre Économique, dirigida pelo nosso velho amigo Christian Harbulot, juntam os seus saberes para criar um livro singular, um autêntico manual de desenvolvimento do espírito de combate, para civis e militares: “Agir ou subir?: L'esprit commando pour muscler votre projet professionnel ou personnel”.

Apresentação da Obra: “Dans un monde en changement permanent, développer un esprit commando est devenu une question de survie. Mais comment éviter les pièges et saisir les opportunités dans un contexte d’hypercompétition? En adoptant les neuf valeurs et attitudes qui façonnent les commandos: le courage, l’unité, l’humilité, l’adaptabilité, l’excellence, l’humour, l’abnégation, la joie et la détermination.

Ces vertus rendent chacun plus fort pour mener à bien ses projets personnels ou professionnels.

Illustré par de nombreux exemples tant civils que militaires, ce guide de stratégie et de développement personnel invite le lecteur à s’interroger sur lui-même, à modifier sa façon de voir et à suivre la voie commando pour remporter les combats qui lui tiennent à cœur.”

Apresentação dos Autores: “Raphaël Chauvancy est officier supérieur des Troupes de marine. Il est détaché depuis 2018 au sein des UK Commando Forces. Également chargé de cours à l’École de guerre économique, il a consacré plusieurs livres aux problématiques de pédagogie, de commandement et d’intelligence stratégique.

Praticien-chercheur en Intelligence Économique, Nicolas Moinet est Professeur des universités à l’IAE de Poitiers. Également chargé de cours à l’École de guerre économique et officier de réserve, il est fortement impliqué dans la diffusion de l’esprit de défense.”

Uma obra indispensável nas bibliotecas de todos os que não se resignam a sofrer os acontecimentos e suas consequências e preferem... agir.

O "Caso dos Russos de Setúbal" É a Ponta de um Iceberg

O caso de Setúbal não é de Setúbal, é nacional. O caso de Setúbal não é um “caso”, é a ponta de um iceberg. O caso de Setúbal exige, portanto, um adequado tratamento nacional e não o uso de um qualquer “tira-nódoas” local. 

O caso de Setúbal revela uma realidade que ninguém parecia (ou parece...) querer ver: a infiltração de organismos do Estado Português por agentes de influências estrangeiras. Muito frequentemente, nada amigas e, por definição, em divergência com os interesses e orientações do Estado Português.

Em Setúbal, o SIS terá detectado a “marosca” há uns oito anos, em 2014. E tem-na monitorizado até hoje. E, naturalmente, tê-la-á reportado a quem tinha que a reportar. O trabalho do SIS é esse. O SIS é um serviço de inteligência e não uma polícia.

Mas quantas câmaras mais, quantos mais organismos do Estado Português se encontram sob influência de interesses e agentes de estados estrangeiros? De russos a chineses, de iranianos a cubanos, quem é que manipula o quê e quem nos aparelhos do Estado Português?

Esse é que é problema nacional que Setúbal revela, é esse o iceberg que a “pontinha” de Setúbal revelou. Ora, o Estado Português não é suposto ter uma vocação de... Titanic. Portanto...

Kissinger sobre a Ucrânia: “Dar a Putin uma saída digna e segura e não tocar nas fronteiras da Rússia”

Henry Kissinger aconselha a dar aos russos "a dignified and safe way out" e considera não existir risco de uso de armas nucleares por Putin “as long as the US or NATO doesn’t breach Russian borders.” Distanciando-se de retóricas inflamadas, o velho mago da política externa americana falou sobre a guerra na Ucrânia, ao intervir num encontro organizado pela Mauldin Economics.

Segundo a organização do encontro, "Kissinger’s measured, diplomatic responses on how to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict presented a stark contrast to today’s divisive rhetoric. He emphasized the importance of giving Putin a dignified and safe way out of the war: “We need to give the Russians an opportunity to protect themselves [from NATO]—we shouldn’t turn this conflict into a purely technical, economic problem.” He believes that we may be close to a ceasefire and thinks it’s unlikely that nuclear weapons will be used, “as long as the US or NATO doesn’t breach Russian borders.”

Angela Davis: O esplendor do racismo... Intolerável.

Comentários? Para quê...? É uma guerra cultural prolongada...
 

Preparem-se para os impactos da guerra da Ucrânia

Choque triplo - reconhece o Washington Post - aumento dos preços dos combustíveis, aumento dos custos dos alimentos e turbulência financeira... Fuel, food, finance: Brace for impact from Russia’s Ukraine war

Os diversos Estados viverão, porém, este triplo choque de formas e modos muito assimétricos. 

Para os Estados frágeis o triplo choque será (está já a ser...) devastador... Desta questão o Washington Post pouco adianta. 

"The war’s disruptions stack on top of effects from the covid pandemic: disrupted supply chains, surging food and energy costs. That means empty shelves and inflation and, as governments strain to help their populations meet both needs, potential political upheaval.

"That, in turn, will ultimately threaten “America’s own security and economic well-being”...

As soluções de sobrevivência a encontar pelos Estados (sobretudo, para os mais frágeis que são a imensa maioria) vão passar muito (ou mesmo totalmente) pela geopolítica e muito pouco (ou mesmo nada) pelos "mercados"... 

Como diz o Peter Zeihan, este "fim do mundo é apenas o princípio". Portanto...

Recomposição do Sistema de Forças Políticas: Que Revelam as 'Presidenciais' Francesas

Para começar revelam uma mudança radical que a guerra na Ucrânia veio acentuar e acelerar:

"La séquence politique 2017-2022 a transformé radicalement le paysage politique français. Le système des forces politiques qui s’organisait autour du clivage gauche-droite tend désormais à se restructurer autour de trois pôles. Mais la guerre en Ukraine  accélère la recompositionces et au plan idéologique on voit émerger sous ces trois pôles une nouvelle bipolarisation..."

Sobre esta "recomposição" total do sistema de forças e suas possíveis evoluções, ver, por exemplo, a análise do politólogo do CNRS Gérard Grunberg:

https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/la-decomposition-du-systeme-des-forces-politiques-.html

"The End of the World Is Just the Beginning...", by Peter Zeihan

"The era to come—the post-globalization era—will not be implemented by decree. Rather it will be a gradual transition, a transition we are currently undertaking. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will not cause deglobalization; it is a symptom of deglobalization."

O nosso velho "cúmplice" Peter Zeihan apresenta assim a sua mais recente obra, "The End of the World Is Just the Beginning...", uma notável síntese da dinâmica estratégica do quadro geopolítico, a ser lançada no próximo 14 de Junho.

"The path we are on is clear: globalized trade will be replaced with a handful of regional trade systems centered around a dominant power—the US, France, Japan, etc. Do not expect to wake up one day to the news that the world has deglobalized but recognize the events that push us closer to the inevitable. 

"In "The End of the World", I map out the impending collapse of our global economic system focusing on agriculture, energy, manufacturing, transport, and industrial materials."

Uma leitura muito recomendável.

Qual é o valor de uma decisão (bem) informada?

Relatório de Abril 2022 da OODA Loop "Strategic issues to inform your decisions": 

"In an age of uncertainty, corporate intelligence and scenario planning is of increasing importance"

"The report provides a succinct list of issues we believe are critical to making informed decisions, many of which are not being discussed in other business or technology circles."

"We categorize and summarize these big trends into Geopolitical Issues, Technology Trends, Cyber Risk Issues, and Recommendations for Action".

https://www.oodaloop.com/archive/2022/04/12/the-ooda-c-suite-report-operational-intelligence-for-decision-makers/

The Geopolitics of Food, by Jacob Shapiro

Talvez a mais importante análise geopolítica do último ano. De leitura e conhecimento imprescindíveis

• The global agricultural system as it exists today is a manifestation of 100 years of geopolitical competition.

• The world produces enough food to feed everyone, but hunger is rising, people are getting fatter, and we waste 40% of the food we produce.

• The future of the world will be determined by changes happening in global fertilizer markets and grain markets.

The Importance of Food

Food is the essence of geopolitics. There is no more basic human need than securing access to food and water, and, as a result, there is no more important geopolitical imperative for national governments than to ensure their people do not starve. A government that fails to provide food security will not stand long.

This idea is more deeply embedded in your consciousness than you probably realize. Let’s get biblical for a second. Yeah, I said biblical - where else do you get content on the geopolitics of the Bible other than at Lykeion?

In Genesis 41, Joseph is twiddling his thumbs in a jail cell until he is summoned by Pharoah to interpret a vexing dream. Joseph explains to Pharoah that the dream means Egypt will experience 7 years of plenty – followed by 7 years of famine. Pharoah listens – and appoints Joseph to oversee an export ban on Egyptian grain so that 1/5th of the food gathered during the 7 years of plenty is saved for the 7 years of famine. Joseph ends up being right – and manages Egypt’s agricultural sector so well that the Israelite population of Egypt explodes. Eventually, a new Pharoah rises over Egypt and becomes afraid of the Israelite numbers and decides to enslave them and drown their first-born boys. Ok, we won’t digress much more…

There are two extremely important insights to glean from the story of Joseph and his amazing technicolor wheat tariffs:

· The first is that for most of human civilization, access to food was not assured. Even after the Neolithic Revolution (when agriculture became a thing) and the emergence of large-scale human societies in the crescent of civilization of the Middle East – based largely around rivers as they are more predictable than rain – leaders lost sleep at night over what they would do if a famine occurred.

· We are all used to going to the grocery store and getting non-GMO organic free-range elk meat whenever we fancy it. Most humans that have ever lived have not enjoyed the predictable and stable access to food we treat as commonplace in the Western world.

· The second is that when agricultural yields increase, so does population. That can mean all sorts of good things – economic growth, artistic expression, technological innovation – but it can also mean more conflict. Human brains have been conditioned for millennia to worry about scarcity – so that even when we are rich in resources, we tend to compete for them anyway.

· Remember all that dumb toilet paper hoarding when the pandemic lockdowns first started? The same impulse is behind the depressing fact that the world produces more than enough food to feed almost 1.5 times the global population – and yet global hunger has been on the risefor years.

A Broken System

The global food system today is broken. For decades, a combination of rising incomes, record harvests, liberalized trade, and lower food prices helped decrease global hunger rates significantly. Global progress was so good that in 2015, the United Nations set a goal of eliminating world hunger by 2030. But then things changed.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the UN was off to a rough start. In 2015, almost 630 million people were chronically undernourished according to the UN, which defines undernourished people as individuals whose food intake falls below the minimum level of dietary energy requirements. "630 million people" sounds like a lot, but it actually reflectedreal progress, as it was equivalent to a 23% decline from undernourishment levels in 1990-1992. That number, however, increased to 690 million in 2019.

· COVID-19 badly exacerbated the situation, as an additional 161 million fell back into hunger. As a result, roughly 1 in 10 people in the world are undernourished today, and that figure is going to rise sharply due to the Russia-Ukraine war. But hold that thought – we’ll come back it in a few.

“So what?” the callous among you might be thinking. Hunger has been a global problem since humans were walking on two feet – that’s not a sign the global food system is broken. It’s just a sign that hunger has been a problem that we’re gradually solving, with ups and downs along the way.

Let’s add in two more mind-blowing statistics:

· Even as hunger is increasing, people are getting fatter. Worldwide obesity rates have tripled since 1975. More than 1.9 billion adults are overweight. Almost 40% of people in the world over the age of 18 years old are overweight. I live in Louisiana, where according to the Centers for Disease Control, the self-reported obesity rate is 38%. Sheesh!

· And perhaps the most depressing of all: an estimated one third of the world’s food is lost or wasted each year. The USDA estimates that food waste in the US is equivalent to 30 to 40% of food supply, corresponding to roughly 133 billion pounds of food, or $161 billion. According to an EPA estimate from 2010, the average American wastes 219 pounds of food every year.

To recap: The world produces enough food to feed everyone, but hunger is rising, people are getting fatter, and we waste 40% of the food we produce. Can you think of another industry in which that kind of waste and these kinds of irrationalities could continue indefinitely, especially given the importance of it to our survival?

The FAO estimates that, to satisfy the growing demand driven by population growth and dietary changes, global food production has to increase by 60% by 2050. You could get most of the way there by just eliminating waste, building better infrastructure, and increasing yields with modern technology in developing markets.

Hopefully, you are now convinced that the global food system is broken. The question then becomes – why is it broken… and what does this have to do with geopolitics? The answers to those questions are one and the same. The way global agriculture works today is an expression of a unipolar geopolitical world.

Our global food system – which has been wildly successful at increasing production and decreasing human suffering – is a manifestation of the rise of the United States as a dominant global power, one whose interests were best served by liberalizing global trade and exporting its agricultural products abroad to developing countries.

It is not a coincidence that geopolitics – the discipline of understanding how nation-states will behave based on their imperatives and constraints (read the primer if you haven’t!) – emerged around the same time that a revolution was taking place in global agriculture.

So, let’s review a little bit of history to understand precisely how we got here – and then look ahead with clear eyes, full bellies, CAN’T LOSE.

Revolutions, Demographics, and Calories

The Industrial Revolution, sparked by the advent of steam power in late-18th century Britain, was a tremendously important period in history. Fromroughly 1760-1840, mechanical production led to massive increases in capacity and productivity. The political fallout was transformative. The politics of identity broadened from one’s village to one’s nation. The American and French Revolutions birthed new republics. New nations emerged in Italy and Germany. Europe’s hunger for markets led to the Opium Wars – and the eventual collapse of the Qing Dynasty. The United Kingdom, after winning the Napoleonic wars, gave the Mughal Empire the coup de grâce and created the basis for modern India. Vast multiethnic empires fell one by one, replaced by more homogeneous nation-states. It is difficult to overstate just how much the Industrial Revolution changed the world.

The Industrial Revolution, however, would not have been possible if it were not for its less mentioned precursor: the Agricultural Revolution of the 16th and 17thcenturies .....

Continuar a ler aqui:

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2022/03/31/the_geopolitics_of_food_824837.html

Conhecer e Perceber a Cultura Russa

José Mateus

Comprei, há anos, umas calças e um blusão russos. Para ver e sentir como seria vestir a normal ‘farpela’ de um russo de Kazan, Moscovo ou Vladivostoque. Andei meses para ‘incorporar’ a sua lógica de organização, tanto das calças como do blusão, e ainda hoje, quando os visto, preciso de uns segundos (ou mesmo mais...) para conseguir descobrir onde guardei os óculos de sol, em que sítio está a caneta ou onde pára a carteira... Roupa bem pensada e eficiente, mas 'matrizada' de forma  completamente diferente da que podemos adquirir na Europa ou nos USA. 

Isto, esta dificuldade de entendimento com uma simples roupa de uso corrente, ilustra bem como a cultura russa é diferente da euro-americana e como o lidar com ela não é coisa óbvia e requer estudo e conhecimento.

Tempos depois, em Paris, conheci a C. que era russa (embora se tivesse fixado em França muitos anos antes) e trabalhava como ‘assistente’ do CEO de uma grande empresa que era minha cliente. Pouco depois, o CEO, durante um almoço de trabalho, perguntou-me o que eu pensava dela. “É – respondi-lhe - o retrato de um tanque T-34, vai tudo à frente”. O T-34 não é uma tecnologia recente, data da II Guerra, mas foi nele que a C. me fez pensar quando a vi a trabalhar.

Russian Butt Slap Competition

Recentemente, foi inventado na Rússia um novo “desporto” que vale bem a pena observar com atenção, vendo para além das (belas) aparências, e reflectir sobre ele... Sobre as suas regras e os seus objectivos e o que nos podem dizer da “alma” russa.

Explicação deste recentíssimo “desporto” russo pelo inglês Daily Star.

Numa perspectiva mais histórica e literária, mas com muito século XX pelo meio e muitos mergulhos na 'alma' russa, veja-se o escritor muito apreciado pelo conde Alexandre de Marenches, Vladimir Volkoff. 

Como refere a Wiki, "With Le Montage ("The Set Up"; winner of the Grand Prix du roman de l'Académie française, 1982) Volkoff illustrated the methods and networks of tricks and traps of Soviet "disinformation" in Europe; the idea of this novel could have come from Alexandre de Marenches, director of the SDECE (now DGSE), who may have provided the factual basis for its plot."

O conhecimento não supõe qualquer justificação e muito menos uma aceitação. É apenas imprescindível. Cinco séculos antes de Cristo, um clássico asiático deixou isso gravado em lâminas de bambu atadas com fios de seda: “Conhece o teu inimigo e conhece-te a ti mesmo e vencerás mil batalhas sem perigo”.

Vídeo do novo "desporto" russo no Youtube: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pam_0sTmh7I&t=377s

"The Russia Archive": Novo Capítulo na Guerra de Informação

"ICIJ announces the Russia Archive, an inside look at the hidden wealth of oligarchs and elites close to Putin

"To highlight and advance what our investigations have uncovered about how the offshore system bolsters networks of wealth behind Putin and his longtime allies, ICIJ is launching the Russia Archive.

"In the Russia Archive, you can explore past ICIJ exposés on the financial secrets of Russian elites, insights on the professional enablers who’ve made it possible for them to move and hide money offshore, and our ongoing coverage of sanctions regimes, dirty money reforms and more."

https://www.icij.org/investigations/russia-archive/icij-releases-the-russia-archive-an-inside-look-at-how-elites-close-to-putin-hide-wealth-offshore/