terça-feira, 29 de dezembro de 2020

Estratégia de Conquista: A China Joga ‘Go’

O milenar jogo de “Go” é a matriz da estratégia chinesa de conquista do mundo. Explicações de Christian Harbulot, Alain Juillet e outros.

“Comment, en une quarantaine d’années, la Chine a quitté son statut de pays en voie de développement et s’est hissée au premier plan, à une vitesse extraordinaire, grâce à une stratégie clairement revendiquée par le dirigeant actuel, Xi Jinping: «La diplomatie chinoise est comme le go.» 

Un jeu chinois millénaire dont Christian Harbulot, directeur de l’École de Guerre Économique, rappelle le principe d’encerclement: «Encercler, ça veut dire créer une logique de suprématie acceptée. 

Mais ça ne veut pas dire détruire et soumettre.» Un «jeu qui dure longtemps», rappelle Wang Yiwe, délégué de la mission chinoise auprès de l’Europe (2008-2011), et où l’«on se moque des petites défaites et des petites victoires».  

Tout débute en 1975 avec la visite de Deng Xiaoping en France. Le leader chinois a acquis la conviction qu’il peut sortir son pays du sous-développement en l’ouvrant sur le monde. 

«Il vient avec une idée en tête, se souvient Claude Martin, ancien ambassadeur de France à Pékin. Acheter des technologies, acheter des usines, ouvrir la Chine au monde moderne.» Après la mort de Mao, il met son plan à exécution. Il sollicite l’aide de la Banque mondiale, et lui annonce son ambition: multiplier en vingt ans le PIB par quatre. 

«Den Xiaoping était avant tout un visionnaire, souligne Alain Juillet, ancien directeur du renseignement à la DGSE. La stratégie qu’il a écrite et expliquée à l’époque était celle que les Chinois ont appliquée jusqu’à aujourd’hui.» 

Alléchés par cet énorme marché, les Occidentaux se ruent en Chine, acceptent des transferts massifs de technologies et ferment les yeux sur les violations des droits de l’homme. À l’image de Jacques Chirac, premier chef d’État occidental à rendre visite à Jiang Zemin après les événements de la place Tian’anmen, en 1989. 

En 2001, l’OMC accueille en son sein la République populaire de Chine, qui accepte de faire des concessions à ses nouveaux partenaires économiques avant d’avancer de nouveaux pions… 

Une stratégie à long terme 

Car bientôt il devient urgent de capter les bénéfices générés au profit des entreprises étrangères… «On devait fabriquer 800 millions de chemises pour acheter un Boeing, raconte Tao Weibin, journaliste économique indépendant. Alors on s’est demandé si le moment n’était pas venu d’améliorer notre mode de développement.» Objectif: la maîtrise des industries de pointe. 

Avec le train à grande vitesse, la Chine réussit un coup de maître en faisant jouer la concurrence étrangère, alléchée par «le contrat du siècle», accélérant ainsi le transfert de technologies. Mais aucune entreprise étrangère ne rafle la mise, car le pays communiste est désormais en mesure d’inaugurer en 2011 son propre TGV: le Pékin-Shanghai. 

«La culture de la copie est dans la culture chinoise, explique Claude Martin. Donc c’est très dur de développer une vraie politique de la protection intellectuelle.» 

Le règne de Xi Jinping 

L’élection de Xi Jinping marque le début d’une nouvelle ère: il affiche d’emblée son ambition de donner à la Chine la place de première puissance mondiale et affirme son autoritarisme. Il n’a aucune clémence pour le prix Nobel de la paix et intellectuel Liu Xiaobo, qui meurt en prison sous les caméras du monde entier. 

«C’est vraiment la fin des illusions!» résume François Bougon, journaliste de l’AFP à Pékin (2005-2010), 

«La Chine est très puissante. Qu’elle soit vertueuse ou pas n’a aucune importance, précise le dissident syndicaliste Cai Chongguo. Il suffit que tout le monde nous craigne, reconnaisse nos succès.»

En quarante ans, le salaire moyen d’un Chinois a été multiplié par 100. Et la Chine continue de tisser sa toile autour du monde.

«Il faut mesurer le renversement stratégique que cela représente, explique l’ancien ministre de l’Économie et des Finances Bruno Le Maire. Aujourd’hui, la totalité des investissements financiers de la Chine en Afrique est supérieure à l’ensemble des investissements de la Banque mondiale. Ça veut dire qu’à un ordre occidental s’est substitué un ordre chinois.»

En 2013, Xi Jinping lance les nouvelles routes de la soie devant un parterre de plus de 1 500 chefs d’État étrangers. Pour échapper à la mondialisation occidentale, ce projet titanesque de réseau de nouvelles routes est destiné à favoriser les échanges commerciaux entre la Chine et le reste du monde. «C’est Marco Polo à l’envers !»

Xi Jinping ne limite pas la présence chinoise au marché : en 2017, il inaugure la première base militaire chinoise à Djibouti. Mais c’est bien une guerre économique qui va bientôt se jouer entre la Chine et les États-Unis qui voient leurs positions mises en péril…”

Continua no site de Philippe Sollers:

http://www.pileface.com/sollers/spip.php?article2328



segunda-feira, 28 de dezembro de 2020

“Ao Serviço do Estrangeiro”... A Nova Traição das Elites

É “a nova traição das elites”, como diz o autor. “Políticos, altos funcionários, espiões ou líderes empresariais passados ao serviço da defesa de interesses estrangeiros.” E ainda jornalistas, universitários, magistrados e até militares. Todos eles “ao serviço do estrangeiro”. 

Não será por um simples prato de lentilhas mas é por pouco mais: um carro de luxo (às vezes azul-cueca, às vezes rosa...) ou uma casinha (às vezes um casarão... ou até mesmo um grande hotel) na praia (às vezes na Califórnia, outras no Oriente...). E nem é preciso procurar muito para encontrar nesta “nova traição” ex-primeiro-ministros, e ex-ministros da Defesa, ex-chefes de espiões... e até um outro ex-presidente.

Portugal já merecia (e muito precisava!) uma investigação destas...!

Entrevista com o autor Clément Fayol:  https://tv.marianne.net/rencontres/-ces-francais-au-service-de-l-etranger-?autoplay=true&startTime=0.017486

domingo, 27 de dezembro de 2020

Leituras nestes dias de "Boas Festas" (quando o "chinavirus" comemora o seu primeiro aniversário)

São leituras mas também releituras, revisões e um pouco mais.

Há muitos anos, por exemplo, que ninguém da equipa “intelNomics” pegava nos "Escritos Militares" de Mao, excepto talvez apenas no "Da Guerra Prolongada". Pois bem, está na altura. Mao fundou a matriz do pensamento militar do Partido Comunista Chinês e do seu Exército Popular de Libertação, logo da actual República Popular da China.

Quando se tornou claro para toda a gente (chineses incluídos) que o PCC e a RPC se assumem já como o challenger na disputa da hegemonia global contra os Estados Unidos (e, portanto, se afirmam como a segunda superpotência mas já candidata a primeira...) e quando já é claro que pretendem substituir a actual hegemonia marítima por uma hegemonia continentalista, está na altura de revisitar Mao e os seus escritos.

Revisitar Mao e com a sua obra matricial confrontar, por exemplo, o trabalho dos coronéis chineses (datado de 1999), o já famoso "Unrestrited Warfare" (“written by two PLA air force political officers, Senior Col Qiao Liang and Senior Col Wang Xiangsui” e sobre o qual escrevemos, no 'Diário de Notícias', na altura que apareceu a tradução em inglês, cremos que em 2002).


Al Santoli aponta, na introdução à edição em inglês, uma estranha coincidência: "on pages 121-122 of 'unrestricted warfare' you find that China's military planners predicted attacks on the World Trade Center by terrorist groups some three years before September 11, 2001. In the same paragraph, Osama bin Laden is named as "as one of the likely perpetrators" ... The passage is remarkable in that “unrestricted warfare” was published in 1999 by the People's Liberation Army literature and Arts publishing house-more than three years before the Sept 11 attacks."

Mas, ao fazer estas confrontações, não se pode esquecer o fundamento da cultura estratégica chinesa. E, não, não é à obra de Sun Tsu que nos refirimos, embora ela tenha a sua importância. É aos, entre nós, pouco conhecidos, (creio que nem há tradução em português) mas muito influentes na cultura  político-militar dos comunistas chineses, "Les 36 stratagèmes: traité secret de stratégie chinoise".

Sobre o "grande jogo" dos comunistas chineses e os seus estratagemas, um dos europeus que melhor conhece a China e melhor a sabe "ler" escreveu, nos últimos anos algumas notas muito interessantes e deu algumas entrevistas (a imprensa escrita mas também audio-visual).

É imprescindível ver atentamente estas "leituras" do ex-maoista (dos anos 60/70) e actual "papa" da inteligência económica e, claro, da guerra económica, o nosso velho amigo Christian Harbulot que há muito tem estudado a fundo tanto as concepções chinesas de estratégia como as suas práticas. (Ver, por exemplo:  “L’Europe est dans une «posture suicidaire à terme» dans ses relations avec Pékin” ; “Harbulot décrypte pour Atlantico la stratégie de la Chine pour projeter sa puissance” ; "Les Chinois en ont trop fait pour masquer leurs responsabilités" ; “La Chine est-elle devenue une puissance nocive?” ; “Christian Harbulot Desencripta o Jogo de Pequim “ ; "Stratégie Indirect et Matrice Culturelle Chinoise - Réflexions autour du Traité de l'Efficacité"...)

O grande jogo dos comunistas chineses inspira-se, claro, do jogo do "Go" (designação japonesa por que é conhecido) ou, como Mao preferia designá-lo, numa manifestação nacionalista, "Wei Chi" (game of Go and the chinese word for "crisis"). Olhando para o tabuleiro global em que o PCC desenvolve o seu "wei-chi", outras leituras surgem como necessárias.

Por exemplo, "A Vingança da Geografia", de Robert Kaplan (e se outras razões não houvesse bastaria a de procurar saber como a potência marítima vê o mundo actual e com que lentes...). Mas também as notas dos últimos anos de John Robb e ainda o seu clássico "Brave New War" com os conceitos de "disruption" e de "systempunkt disruption". (Ver, por exemplo: Partial vs. Complete System Disruption ; Cascade-based attacks on complex networks ; Cascading System Failure ; Basic Systems Disruption ; War Nerd: How the IRA Used Systems Disruption...).


Finalmente, mas não menos importante, uma pequena mas profunda introspecção, um olhar para o que somos nós e a nossa liberdade e como criámos, na segunda metade do século XVII, este conceito de liberdade que iria ser determinante na evolução nossa e do mundo.

Falamos, é evidente, de Bento de Espinosa (o filho de uns alentejanos emigrados, por estúpidas razões religiosas, para a Amesterdão do século XVII) e do seu grupo amigos e partners em que não se pode deixar de incluir um homem da geração anterior, o filósofo português Uriel da Costa, também exilado pelas mesmas bandas.

Uriel d'Acosta instructing the young Spinoza, by Samuel Hirszenberg


Maxime Rovère oferece, no seu “Le clan Spinoza – Amsterdam, 1677, l’invention de la liberté”, uma fabulosa panorâmica do teatro de luta deste grupo, o clan Espinosa, contra a intolerância reinante e pela invenção da liberdade.


A 19 deste mês, ao finalizar o ano, a equipa “intelNomics” iniciou este programa de “leituras e revisões”, como uma espécie de balanço deste ano atípico, contando terminá-lo até 4 do próximo Janeiro, quando o disruptivo e disruptor “coronavirus” completa o seu (oficial...) primeiro aniversário. Convidamos os nossos amigos e leitores a dar a sua própria vista de olhos pelas componentes do ‘programa’ e para isso aqui o apresentamos.

Boas leituras e que 2021 seja marcado pelo que mais se precisa: resiliência, inteligência e estratégia.

 

 

 

 

 

 

segunda-feira, 21 de dezembro de 2020

What a Wonderful War!

Quem é que pediu uma guerra biológica de baixa intensidade mas altamente disruptiva e disruptora...?

Quando John Robb publicou, em 2007, o seu "Brave New War" não imaginava talvez que o seu inovador conceito de "disruption" (“the use of systems disruption as a method of strategic warfare") pudesse saltar dos conflitos com "small, ad hoc bands of like-minded insurgents" para os "state-against-state conflicts", para os conflitos estratégicos entre "great powers"... E, no entanto, praticamente ao mesmo tempo, dois estrategistas chineses, os coronéis Qiao Liang et Wang Xiangsui, tinham elaborado (mas de circulação muito restrita...) a sua obra sobre a arte da guerra assimétrica, traduzida em inglês (a partir de um exemplar conseguido na China pela inteligência americana) com o esclarecedor título "Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America". 


Nesta obra, o conceito de "disruption", elaborado em paralelo por Robb, está ausente. Mas uma leitura atenta revela rapidamente que, embora não conhecendo o conceito, os dois coronéis chineses deu a máxima importância à sua realidade... E que essa realidade de "disruption" é uma das componentes da resposta que eles encontram para derrotar um inimigo que não está ao seu alcance numa guerra convencional.

O que Robb estava a ver nas pequenas guerras dos bandos terroristas foi avocado pelos coronéis chineses para o seu tabuleiro estratégico, para o tabuleiro de um "grande". Agora, no início deste século XXI, a coisa mudou de escala e a importância do conceito aumentou exponencialmente...

A nova guerra chinesa é definida por Qiao Liang et Wang Xiangsui como uma "guerre combinée hors limites sur le mode latéral-frontal". Na sua leitura desta estratégia chinesa, a École de Guerre Économique destaca alguns dos seus aspectos-chave, com algumas esclarecedoras citações: 

«Aujourd’hui, le terrain de la guerre a dépassé les domaines terrestre, maritime, aérien, spatial et électronique pour s’étendre aux domaines de la sécurité, de la politique, de l’économie, de la diplomatie, de la culture et même de la psychologie…» 

«Il n’existe plus de domaine qui ne puisse servir la guerre et il n’existe presque plus de domaines qui ne présentent l’aspect offensif de la guerre.» 

«Le champ de bataille de la guerre hors limites n’est pas le même que par le passé puisqu’il comprend tous les espaces naturels, l’espace social et l’espace en pleine croissance de la technologie, tel l’espace nanométrique. Désormais ces différents espaces s’interpénètrent.»

«Si nous voulons nous assurer la victoire dans les guerres à venir nous devons mener une guerre affectant tous les domaines de la vie du pays concerné sans que l’action militaire en soit l’élément dominant. Dans les guerres du futur, les moyens militaires ne seront qu’un choix parmi d’autres.»


domingo, 13 de dezembro de 2020

A Royal Navy vai proteger as águas britânicas dos pesqueiros europeus

Em caso de “no deal” no Brexit, a Armada britânica está pronta a interditar as águas britânicas aos pescadores da UE, a partir do próximo (já muito próximo...) dia 1 de Janeiro 2020. O Guardian revelou o plano de Londres para defender o seu peixe...

Four navy ships to help protect fishing waters in case of no-deal Brexit


Four Royal Navy patrol ships will be ready from 1 January to help the UK protect its fishing waters in the event of a no-deal Brexit, in a deployment evoking memories of the “cod wars” in the 1970s.

The 80-metre-long armed vessels would have the power to halt, inspect and impound all EU fishing boats operating within the UK’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which can extend 200 miles from shore.

Naval sources said the deployment had been long planned, but it comes after Conservative ministers quietly doubled the total fleet of patrol ships from four to eight, partly in case of a crisis caused by a no-deal Brexit. “We have done a lot of work to ensure we are ready for every eventuality,” one insider said.

Although the offshore patrol ships carry machine guns, they would not be expected to use weapons against EU fishing boats. Instead they would aim to run alongside a vessel believed to be breaking the rules, boarding it for inspection if deemed necessary.

In extreme cases, an EU boat could be impounded and taken to the nearest UK port. “Nobody is going to be firing warning shots against French fishermen; firearms are only used when there is danger to life,” the navy source said...

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/dec/11/four-navy-ships-to-help-protect-uk-waters-in-case-of-no-deal-brexit

sábado, 12 de dezembro de 2020

O dissidente iraniano Rouhollah Zam assassinado em Teerão

Jornalista e opositor ao regime dos ayatolas, Rouhollah Zam foi hoje enforcado em Teerão, depois de uma farsa de "julgamento". Rouhollah Zam estava, há 7 anos, exilado em França mas há alguns meses foi raptado pelos "Guardas da Revolução" (os Pasdaran) e levado para o Irão onde foi agora assassinado pelo regime islamista dos ayatolas.

 

https://news.sky.com/story/ruhollah-zam-iranian-dissident-executed-after-being-lured-back-to-country-12158984





terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2020

"A denúncia do populismo dissimula uma populofobia”

Doutor em Ciências Políticas e conhecedor das profundezas da história da Europa, Guillaume Bigot explica, nesta obra acabada de sair, a questão do “populismo”,  arrasa a decadente presidência de Macron, expõe a crescente fractura entre povo e elites, mostra como essas elites desenvolveram uma populofobia (“o governo da elite, pela elite e para a elite”) e como e porquê é preciso substituí-las. Uma análise que não pode ser passada em claro. 

Apresentação: 

“La France d'aujourd'hui n'est pas sans rappeler celle de 1789. Le roi s'appuie sur une noblesse de robe (la haute fonction publique) et d'épée (les capitalistes). Un néoclergé médiatique et culturel prie pour l'ouverture, la tolérance, la construction européenne, les migrants et la sauvegarde du climat. Formant l'immense base de cette échelle matérielle et symbolique, un tiers état salarié pâtit plus qu'il ne profite de la mondialisation. 

Cet ordre est désormais chancelant. Toute aristocratie connaît trois âges successifs, comme l'avait vu Chateaubriand: "l'âge des supériorités, l'âge des privilèges et l'âge des vanités; sortie du premier, elle dégénère dans le second et s'éteint dans le troisième". 

Dans cet essai percutant, qui offre une fascinante introspection sur l'identité profonde de notre nation, Guillaume Bigot explique pourquoi et comment notre classe dirigeante actuelle, entrée dans son troisième âge, doit être remplacée.” 

Descritivo 

“La cause semble entendue: en Occident voire dans le monde entier, cédant aux sirènes du populisme, les peuples semblent avoir pris en grippe leurs élites. Mais, est-ce que ce ne sont pas les classes dirigeantes qui, en vérité, avaient déjà décidé de rompre avec leurs peuples?

Est-ce que ce n'est pas le sommet qui n'aime plus la base? Tel est le point de départ de l'essai décapant que Guillaume Bigot consacre à la colère des gilets jaunes et au besoin de renouvellement de la classe dirigeante française. 

Ce divorce, que les élites mondialisées voulurent partout à l'amiable, a revêtu une tournure particulièrement exacerbée en France avec la spectaculaire crise des ronds-points. En replaçant la révolte de la France périphérique dans le long terme de notre histoire, l'auteur montre que les élites françaises aiment rarement le peuple, qui le leur rend bien. 

Relisant la crise de 2018-2019 il montre que cette explosion de colère est le prélude d'une remise en cause plus profonde et durable des classes dirigeantes françaises. 

Car Guillaume Bigot éclaire l'actualité en lui apportant le relief de l'histoire, sans lequel celle-ci demeure difficile à interpréter et impossible à prévoir. Et applique à la société de 2020 les analyses de l'abbé Sieyès sur le tiers état. En s'appuyant également sur Michelet, il montre que l'Hexagone ne peut être gouverné que par un souverain allié au peuple pour tenir en respect les importants. 

Enfin, la loi des 3 âges des classes dirigeantes formulée par Chateaubriand lui sert de point d'appui pour appeler au renouvellement profond de la classe dirigeante française. 

Selon l'essayiste, la France est entrée en convulsions et n'en sortira que lorsque l'élite actuelle et son paradigme auront été remplacés. Voici le plaidoyer d'un intellectuel républicain en faveur du populisme.”




segunda-feira, 30 de novembro de 2020

Da Guerra Económica pelos Recursos

O nosso amigo Giuseppe Gagliano mostra como se desenvolve a guerra económica pelos recursos e como o "neo-liberalismo" é uma inconsistente e falida narrativa ideológica sem base de sustentação no mundo actual.

The Economic War for Resource, by Giuseppe Gagliano

In the liberal logic, states, focusing on “hub” or “network” strategies, would have every interest in managing their natural resources based on the laws of the market and the generalized fluidity of trade. This rather ideological view seems to be discredited today. 

The 2008 crisis ended up undermining widespread trust in the self-regulation mechanisms of the markets. And among the determinants of power, the possession and exploitation of the riches of the subsoil and the seabed occupy an increasingly prominent place.

In a world that is about to reach 9 billion inhabitants by 2050, the logic of self-sufficiency or less dependence pushes nations more than ever to compete for the supply of raw materials. The competition for their control, which has never ceased to structure international relations, has intensified particularly evidently in recent years.

In the agricultural sector, the hunger riots that occurred in 2008, following the huge increase in the price of agricultural raw materials, accelerated the global movement to buy back arable land (“land grabbing”) by foreign investors. The United States, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and China are among the main buyers. Their goals: Africa and Latin America, where 90% of the unexploited arable land is located. These appetites generate tension and distrust.

The issue of hydrocarbons is always at the center of the power games. After successfully exploiting its shale gas reserves, the United States is once again self-sufficient. Saudi Arabia, a major former supplier, now fears a loosening of the bond that united America and protected it from Iran. His feverish behavior in the Iraqi and Syrian crises is partly due to this new political-energy equation. Another example of significant development is the case of Greenland, where oil reserves are now estimated to be half that of Saudi Arabia. Combined with the 2008 referendum on extended autonomy (75% yes), this new perspective will accelerate the movement towards eventual independence. The maneuvers of the great powers are already multiplying around the island, which adds to its strategic position appetizing energy prospects.

One sector, among all, appears particularly emblematic of the future tensions around raw materials, namely that of mineral resources. Since the late 1990s, sustained global economic growth, driven by emerging countries since the 2008 financial crisis, has caused the price of raw materials, particularly extractive ones, to rise. The end of easily accessible resources has strong geopolitical implications: it triggers the race for new resources hitherto protected from the hostility of their ecological environments (poles, offshore hills, dense forests) or geopolitical environments.

Does the specter of Resource Nationalism reappear? Certainly. Today it goes beyond the well-documented cases of Russia, Bolivia or China. The information went unnoticed, but Madagascar, long a land of passive exploitation of the appetites of mining multinationals, announced in September 2014 the creation of a public mining company to exploit the country’s resources in full sovereignty.

Let’s take another example: Boeing and United Technologies Corporation have decided to stock up on titanium, an essential substance for aeronautics, as it represents 15 to 20% of the metals used in a modern aircraft. Who is the main titanium supplier in the world? The Russian group VSMPO. Do the two American companies, whose decision was revealed in August, fear possible retaliation in the context of the Ukrainian crisis? Recall that US law in theory prohibits companies working for the Department of Defense from purchasing their titanium overseas, but that the two groups, in this case, produce for both the civilian sector and their military customers. Titanium was also, symbolically, the material for the flag that Russia planted in 2007 at a depth of 4,200 meters to assert its sovereignty on the Arctic continental shelf … The gas is therefore far from summarizing the levers it intends to use. Vladimir Putin in the current match between Washington, Brussels, Kiev and Moscow.

Furthermore, Ukraine is not the only interesting geo-economic example in the new framework of the “war” on mineral resources, which seems to be taking an increasingly dramatic turn. Between China and Japan, the blackmail of the offer is regularly brandished in the context of territorial tensions between the two countries of the China Sea. In this area, the level of economic interdependence between the major nations (South Korea, Japan, People’s Republic of China, Taiwan) is certainly increasing and a sim The intertwining would tend, under a certain angle, to reduce the risks of regional explosion. Now, although economic actors seem mature enough to overcome the suspicious approaches that states maintain by pooling geo-economic issues, it alone does not seem sufficient to build regional stability.

The 2010 Sino-Japanese confrontation around the Senkaku Islands, which resumed in 2012 and 2013, therefore led Beijing to limit its rare earth exports to Japan. This group of 17 metals, whose production is dominated by China, is essential for the manufacture of high-tech products, one of the strengths of the Japanese economy. Tokyo suddenly found itself weakened. And it wasn’t long before he reacted. On March 13, 2012, Japan, supported by the United States and the European Union, filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO), denouncing the restrictions imposed by China on the export of its rare earths. Beijing was condemned in March 2014, without however bringing about any political changes.

Giuseppe Gagliano is President of the Centro Studi Strategici Carlo de Cristoforis (Italy) and specialist in Geopolitics

domingo, 29 de novembro de 2020

A China Não Sobrevive Sem a Água do Tibete

Mas ao apropriar-se, manu militari, da água do Tibete, a China cria tensões insuportáveis com 11 Estados do leste da Ásia que também dependem dessa água... O australiano “The Diplomat” investigou a ameaçadora e explosiva matéria que, em seguida, o francês Courier International retomou em síntese e que agora aqui, pela sua decisiva importância estratégica, se regista.


A China e os insustentáveis problemas da água do Tibete.

 

Tibet’s Rivers Will Determine Asia’s Future 

At the dawn of a new era of building dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo, countless lives and ecosystems are being risked in the name of “development” and geopolitics. 

By Dechen Palmo | The Diplomat | November 01, 2019 

Over the last seven decades, the People’s Republic of China has constructed more than 87,000 dams. Collectively they generate 352.26 GW of power, more than the capacities of Brazil, the United States, and Canada combined. On the other hand, these projects have led to the displacement of over 23 million people. 

The Tibetan plateau is a rich repository of indispensable freshwater resources that are shared across Asia. After damming most of its rivers, China is now casting its eyes on the major international rivers flowing out from the Tibetan plateau, heralding a new era of damming Tibet’s rivers. 

Tibet, known as the “Water Tower of Asia,” serves as the source of 10 major Asian river systems flowing into 10 countries, including many of the most densely populated nations in the world: China, India, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Pakistan. 

China, through its political control over Tibet, has complete upper riparian control over all major rivers flowing out of the Tibetan plateau. Compared to China, Tibet remains a virgin territory with less than 0.6 percent of its hydropower resources being utilized for developmental purposes. But this is changing rapidly. As China seeks to meet its renewable energy targets, Beijing will have to harness yet more hydropower. Chinese hydropower and energy companies have been lobbying the government to allow more hydropower projects to tap into Tibet’s fast-flowing rivers, with as many as 28 proposals awaiting approval. 

Tibet is a geologically unstable region with an average elevation of 4,500 meters above sea level (14,800 feet). Despite the critical state of the Tibetan plateau which remains ecologically sensitive and seismically active, China is still moving on with its ambitious plan to expand the hydropower generation on the headwaters of Asia’s major rivers — the Yangtze, Yellow, Brahmaputra, Indus, Mekong, and Salween Rivers. 

China’s State Council’s energy plan for the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) and 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) confirm the government’s intentions to vigorously push forward the hydropower project on the Tibetan plateau. Hydropower is being promoted as the centerpiece of China’s plan to expand its renewable energy sector. By 2020, China wants to triple its hydropower capacity to 300 GW. Therefore it is increasingly damming transboundary rivers to achieve its hydropower targets. 

The Brahmaputra, know as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibetan, is a major international river shared between Tibet, India, and Bangladesh. It stretches over a total length of 1,800 miles (2,900 km) from west to east, starting on the Tibetan plateau from its source, the Chemayungdung glaciers near the sacred Mount Kailash. 

Once a free-flowing river, it is now dammed on every section. Starting from Zangmu hydroelectric power station, there has been a cascade of dams being built on the Brahmaputra.  Geologist Yang Yong had rightly said that the activity represents “the start of a hydropower era for Tibet’s rivers.” 

In January 2013, China approved three dam projects on the Brahmaputra River as part of its 12th Five-Year Plan, which triggered concerns in the Indian media about the possible impact on downstream flows. In an attempt to downplay India’s concern over these matters, the Chinese government was quick to assure India that the project will be planned and reasoned scientifically. It maintained that the project was a Run-of-River (ROR) hydroelectricity generation project – meaning a part of the river was being diverted to run past electricity generating turbines, and then the water would flow back to join the river. Such a ROR project would, according to that argument, not reduce the water flow and not have any impact downstream. 

These assertions are largely untrue. Instead, ROR projects require storing large volumes of water during the day, only to be released all at once in the evening for generating power during peak energy demand. These daily fluctuations in the river cause an incredible disruption to the river ecology. Moreover, large dams also increase the probabilities of earthquakes, destroy precious environments, and shatter the lives of millions of people who are dependent on the Brahmaputra River. 

Rather than benefiting populations with non-polluting power, China’s dam builders are making a Faustian bargain with nature, selling Tibet’s soul in their drive for economic growth. Taken together there is much scientific evidence that dams are not the clean, green, or cheap source of electric power they are often made out to be. 

It is no surprise that China has begun the construction of three hydropower dams (Dagu, Jiexu, and Jiacha) on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra. The Dagu (660 MW) and Jiexu (560  MW) dams are being constructed upstream of Zangmu and the Jiacha dam (320 MW) downstream of Zangmu — all located within a few kilometers from each other. 

The Zangmu hydropower station (510 MW) is only the start. China plans to build 11 hydropower stations on the Brahmaputra mainstream and several on its tributaries. Huaneng, Huadian, Guodian and Datang — four major power generation groups — have already taken root in Tibet. Among them, Huaneng  is the largest hydropower development in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). 

Huaneng Tibet Power Generation Co. Ltd. (HTPG), a subsidiary of the state-owned China Huaneng Group, has signed multiple agreements with the TAR government regarding the development of clean energy in the region. According to the agreements between the company and the regional government, Huaneng’s installed capacity in Tibet will reach 10,000 megawatts by 2020. It is believed that hydropower resources in the TAR account for 29 percent of the national total. 

According to the plan, Huaneng Group is responsible for the development of the Jiexu and Jiacha hydropower stations whereas Dagu was constructed by Huadian group. 

In addition, the Bayu hydropower station began its survey in November last year. The installed capacity of that power station is 800 MW. 

From time to time, whenever water issues such as floods and other disasters occur in the region, India raises its concerns to Chinese counterparts. Those concerns are met with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or Expert Level Mechanism (ELM), which remains nonbinding and without any governing body that ensures their implementation.

China has so far not communicated officially about the construction of these dams on the Brahmaputra. A lack of transparency about dam building on the Tibetan river raises questions about whether the Tibetan people and the downstream countries were fully informed about the risk and impacts on a river system that supports millions.  

These proposed dams will pose a serious ecological threat not only to the Tibetan plateau but also to the other side of the border. China, by constructing these dams, will be responsible for the overexploitation of the river, which can jeopardize the river ecosystem as well as alter water flows downstream, affecting the farmers and fishermen of India and Bangladesh. 

Moreover, China can also easily manipulate the river flow, which puts India at a strategically disadvantageous position. It is high time for India to take a stand in order to ascertain their user rights on the river and monitor those dam activities on the upper part of the Brahmaputra River. 

The environmental health of the Tibetan plateau is critical for around 1.3 billion people who live in the river basins downstream in Asia. The Tibetan river shouldn’t be seen only as a source of hydropower; its geological significance should also be taken into serious consideration. 

Dechen Palmo is a research fellow at the Tibet Policy Institute. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Tibet Policy Institute.

Géopolitique: Le Tibet, un château d’eau contrôlé par la Chine

Les principaux fleuves qui alimentent le nord de l’Inde et l’Asie du sud-est  prennent leur source dans le plateau tibétain. En construisant des barrages dans la région, la Chine met sous pression les pays en aval. Et menace la survie de millions de personnes. 

“Au cours des sept dernières décennies, la République populaire de Chine a construit plus de 87 000 barrages. Collectivement, ils produisent 352,26 gigawatts d’électricité, plus que les capacités du Brésil, des États-Unis et du Canada réunies”, indique le journal en ligne australien The Diplomat.

Et le plateau tibétain n’a pas été épargné par le programme hydroélectrique chinois. Ce “château d’eau de l’Asie” est à l’origine de neuf grands réseaux fluviaux asiatiques coulant dans onze pays (Chine, Inde, Vietnam, Cambodge, Laos, Thaïlande, Birmanie, Bangladesh, Népal, Bhoutan et Pakistan). En contrôlant le débit des fleuves issus du plateau tibétain, la Chine est en position de force sur les pays riverains. Une source de tensions pour toute l’Asie orientale. 

À LIRE AUSSI  Submersion. Le delta du Mékong est menacé de disparition 

“Des pêcheurs du nord-est de la Thaïlande ont vu leur nombre de prises dans le Mékong chuter, et des agriculteurs vietnamiens et cambodgiens ont dû aller chercher du travail en ville, leurs récoltes ayant diminué. Le point commun : les niveaux d’eau irréguliers le long de la troisième plus longue voie navigable d’Asie”, rapporte le site d’information hongkongais Inkstone. 

“Des ONG affirment que les onze barrages hydroélectriques de la partie chinoise du fleuve, dont cinq ont commencé à fonctionner au cours des trois dernières années, ont perturbé les rythmes saisonniers. Cela menace la sécurité alimentaire de plus de 60 millions de personnes qui dépendent du fleuve pour leur subsistance”, précise le site.

Alea Jacta Est... Trump Manda Evacuar Teerão

Trump, 17.06.2025